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In this work we study the factors, among the determinants of sovereign ratings found in 
the literature, leading to differences in sovereign credit ratings from different agencies, 
for the period 1980-2015. We employ random effects ordered and simple probit 
approaches to assess the explanatory power of different macroeconomic and government 
variables. Our results point to an average performance of the estimated models. Structural 
balance and the existence of a default in the last ten years were the least significant 
variables whereas the level of net debt, budget balance, GDP per capita and the existence 
of a default in the last five years were found to be the most relevant variables explaining 
the rating differences across agencies. 
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Este trabalho analisa que fatores, entre os determinantes de ratings soberanos encontrados 
na literatura, são responsáveis pelas diferenças entre os ratings de crédito soberanos de 
diferentes agências de rating, no período 1980-2015. Para tal, utilizaram-se modelos 
probit ordenados e simples de efeitos aleatórios com o objetivo de avaliar o poder 
explicativo de um conjunto de variáveis macroeconómicas e governamentais. Os 
resultados obtidos com os modelos estimados indicam que o saldo estrutural e a existência 
de um default nos últimos dez anos são as variáveis menos significativas enquanto o nível 
de dívida líquida, o saldo orçamental, o PIB per capita e a existência de um default nos 
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In the current global financial system, credit rating agencies play a crucial role in reducing 
information asymmetries in the financial markets and more recently also provide a 
fundamental input to the financial institutions risk assessment required by regulators, 
since capital requirements are calculated by applying to the institution financial assets a 
weighting factor depending on the associated credit rating. Sovereign credit ratings 
summarise in an ordinal qualitative scale a complex and thorough analysis of the ability 
a country has to service its debt. Since institutional investors nowadays are only allowed 
to acquire financial assets above a certain rating, countries willing to issue debt are in 
practice obliged to pay for a credit rating. 
With the globalization of financial markets and the proliferation of credit ratings, rating 
agencies assigning different credit ratings to the same country became more frequent. 
This work tries to understand which factors may explain the differences between the 
sovereign ratings given to countries from the three main international agencies. 
To accomplish this, we analysed the rating differences between S&P, Moody’s and Fitch 
in the light of a random-effects probit framework and using as explanatory variables a set 
of macroeconomic variables found in the literature as important determinants of 
sovereign ratings. 
Our ordered probit results found, for every dataset used, that the structural balance did 
not contribute to any rating difference here considered. Only the simple probit regressions 
found the structural balance to explain some of the rating differences. The structural 
balance and the variable representing a default in the last ten years were the least 
significant across all our regressions, whereas the level of net debt, budget balance, GDP 
per capita and the variable representing a default in the last five years contribute in more 
than 20% of the regressions to the analysed rating differences1. 
This work is organized as follows: the first section introduces credit rating agencies and 
their importance whereas the second section explains how rating agencies employ their 
assessment methodologies to produce the ratings and reviews a part of the existent body 
of knowledge about the history of credit ratings, the determinants of sovereign ratings 
and split sovereign ratings. Section 3 delves into which variables were chosen to develop 
                                                 
1 Table A8-1 shows how each explanatory variable significance changed across all regressions. 
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this work and explains the adopted regression framework. In section 4 we describe the 
dataset and report on the empirical analysis, namely in terms of our estimation results. 
Section 5 summarises the main findings of this work.  
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2 Literature review 
In spite of being a century old2, credit ratings only began to play a role in US financial 
market regulation in 1931, and over time the reliance by regulators on the information 
conveyed by ratings increased. According to Levich et al. (2012), this increasing usage 
led, in 1975, to the establishment of guidelines by the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission for designating National Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 
(NRSROs). Given the growing globalization of banking and financial markets since the 
1970s, the Bank for International Settlements established a set of risk-based capital 
adequacy levels, which in 1999 were revised to explicitly consider credit ratings in 
determining a bank’s risk capital. 
According to Bhatia (2002), the first sovereign credit ratings were issued by Moody’s 
“just before World War I”3. Before the Great Depression, the predecessor of S&P rated 
bonds from 21 national governments in Europe, South America, North America and Asia. 
Most sovereign ratings were then suspended during World War II and only after the war, 
S&P and Moody’s began again to rate bonds issued by major industrialized countries. 
The withdrawal in 1974 of a tax applied to foreign borrowers in 1963 in the US which 
had driven bond market activity out of the US, marked the beginning of the modern 
sovereign credit ratings era. 
Amstad and Packer (2015) define sovereign ratings as “opinions about the 
creditworthiness of sovereign borrowers that indicate the relative likelihood of default on 
their outstanding debt obligations”. These ratings, like the ratings about other types of 
credit, try to assess both the ability and willingness of the borrower to pay. To accomplish 
this, qualitative factors, like institutional strength and the rule of law, and quantitative 
factors, like measures of fiscal and economic strength, the monetary regime, foreign 
exchange reserves, are analysed to rate a sovereign issuer. Kiff et al. (2012) state that 
ratings are not only about credit risk but also convey information about credit stability 
(changes in credit risk), and the assessments represented by ratings are medium-term 
outlooks that should not change due to the impact of cyclical components. Rating 
volatility should be minimized by rating agencies by assessing through the cycle: a rating 
                                                 
2 According to Sylla (2002), John Moody founded the first rating agency in 1909, in the United States, and 
their first ratings were entirely for the bonded debts of US railroads. 
3 On our rating dataset, obtained from Bloomberg, the oldest rating, a ‘AAA’ rating, was given by S&P to 
Finland in April 1972. 
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should be changed only to reflect a shift in fundamental factors (and consequently a 
change in basic creditworthiness), and not as a response to a recession or a global liquidity 
shortage, for example. Kiff et al. (2012) description of this approach is particularly 
accurate: “vulnerability to cycles affects the rating decision, whereas the current position 
in the cycle does not”. 
Bhatia (2002) affirms that the widespread use by investors of the credit ratings attributed 
by Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody's Investors Service (Moody’s) and Fitch Ratings 
(Fitch) reflects their utility for the market. This usefulness results from the simplicity and 
comparability of the rating systems used by those rating agencies, condensing detailed 
analysis into brief indicators, and from the “perceived analytical strength and 
independence of the agencies themselves”4. Issuers pay for the ratings, expecting to 
attract more investors, or simply to obtain an assessment of their risk, often asking more 
than one agency for a rating at the same time. On the other hand, investors incorporate 
ratings in their decision process (pricing calculations, decisions to buy, sell or hold), 
turning credit ratings into an integral part of today’s capital markets. 
A sovereign credit rating normally serves as the “ceiling” of the ratings within its territory, 
since the sovereign bond yields are considered riskless and therefore used as a benchmark 
against which returns on domestic investments are compared. In parallel, each sovereign 
creditworthiness is compared with the most trustworthy issuers (rated with an ‘AAA’ 
rating), and among those is the German government, whose bonds are regarded as one of 
the global risk-free benchmarks. Given the increasing connectedness of the capital 
markets, the growing issuance of bonded debt and the regulatory role of sovereign ratings 
on investors risk management, changes in sovereign ratings can have profound 
implications. 
Both the Asian crisis in 1997 and the global financial crisis of 2007-08 highlighted flaws 
in the rating systems. In the first case, a rating approach based only on macroeconomic 
fundamentals was the culprit, revealing the importance of contingent liabilities and the 
international liquidity position of the issuers (Bhatia (2002)). In the latter case, and 
according to Brunnermeier (2009), one of the deciding factors contributing to the latest 
financial crisis was the collaboration between banks and rating agencies to ensure their 
                                                 
4 Table II compares the rating scales of the three main credit rating agencies. 
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structured debt products5 had always a tranche reaching the ‘AAA’ rating, even if the 
underlying default risk was not equivalent to the default risk associated with a ‘AAA’ 
bond rating. Fund managers were attracted to buying these structured products offering 
seemingly high expected returns with an acceptable level of risk, and when the quality of 
the securitized assets deteriorated (signalled by a spike in the default rate of the so-called 
subprime mortgages), every holder inevitably faced losses and eventually had to write-
down a significant part of their mortgage-related securities. 
In the wake of the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis, Amstad 
and Packer (2015) highlight the changes in the sovereign risk methodologies used by the 
major rating agencies. These rating methodologies explain which factors drive the 
evaluation of the likelihood of default. A common principle to these revisions is that 
agencies tried to adopt assessment systems more reliant on quantitative inputs, to make 
ratings more transparent and replicable6. 
 Moody’s rating methodology will now be analysed, to illustrate how the rating 
methodologies are now more reliant on quantitative inputs. Moody’s Investors Service 
(2015) explains how it bases its sovereign credit risk assessment on the “interplay” of 
four key factors: economic strength, institutional strength, fiscal strength and 
susceptibility to event risk. The following figure show how Moody’s broad factors 
interact to ultimately produce a sovereign credit rating. 
Figure 1 Key factors affecting Moody's credit risk assessment. 
 
Source: Moody’s Investors Service (2015). 
These broad rating factors are subdivided into sub-factors, each with a different weight 
towards the broad factor.  
                                                 
5 Often called collateralized debt obligations (CDO). 
6 Amstad and Packer (2015) find that ratings can be largely explained by a relatively small set of fewer than 
10 variables, in line with the results of previous studies. 
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Table I provides further detail about how Moody’s arranges sub-factors into each broad 
rating factor. 
Table I Identification of Moody's key rating factors and corresponding sub-factors. 
Broad rating factors Rating sub-factor7 
Factor 1: Economic strength Growth dynamics 
Scale of the economy 
National income 
Factor 2: Institutional strength Institutional framework and effectiveness 
Policy credibility and effectiveness 
Factor 3: Fiscal strength Debt burden 
Debt affordability 
Factor 4: Susceptibility to event risk Political risk 
Government liquidity risk 
Banking sector risk 
External vulnerability risk 
Source: Moody’s Investors Service (2015). 
The transparency achieved by the revision of the Moody’s risk assessment methodology 
is illustrated by Cantor (2012), who showed that using the indicators underlying each 
factor and their weights as a scorecard, one could predict 70% of Moody’s bond ratings 
within two notches and explain 67% of the variation in bond ratings. 
Al-Sakka and ap Gwilym (2010) associate the growing importance of credit rating 
agencies to the increasing number of issuers and debt products, and globalization, but also 
to the requirements applied to institutional investors, banks and financial institutions: the 
first ones are only allowed to trade debt securities rated by NRSROs, whereas the latter, 
stemming from the Basel II Accord, are obliged to use external credit ratings to assess 
their credit risks and to determine capital adequacy requirements. 
The determinants of sovereign credit ratings are an object of study since the seminal work 
of Cantor and Packer (1996), a cross sectional OLS estimation which identified per capita 
income, GDP growth, inflation, external debt, level of economic development and default 
history as important determinants of sovereign ratings assigned by Moody’s and S&P. 
                                                 
7 Each sub-factor encompasses one or more indicator, like average real GDP growth and volatility, nominal 
GDP, GDP per capita, inflation level and volatility, etc. 
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This methodology was also used by Afonso (2003), which also included a logistic and an 
exponential transformation of the ratings, in addition to the linear transformation already 
used. Mulder and Monfort (2000) and Eliasson (2002) generalized the OLS approach to 
panel data, both using a linear transformation of the ratings. 
To overcome the limitation of OLS regressions with a linear transformation of the 
ratings8, Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005) used an ordered probit model for a period of five 
years and 95 countries. 
Afonso et al. (2008) analysed the determinants of sovereign ratings from the three main 
agencies by using a linear regression framework (random effects estimation, pooled OLS 
estimation and fixed effects estimation) versus an ordered response framework (ordered 
probit9 estimation). 
Afonso et al. (2011) confirm that logistic and exponential transformations to ratings 
provide little improvement over the linear transformation, not finding evidence of the so-
called “cliff effects” (when investors adjust their portfolio composition to select only 
investment grade securities). This work also highlights the difference between short- and 
long-term determinants, concluding that GDP per capita, GDP growth, government debt 
and budget balance have a short-term impact, whereas government effectiveness, external 
debt, foreign reserves and default history influence ratings in the long-run. 
Starting with Cantor and Packer (1996) selection of macroeconomic variables, the work 
from different authors that followed progressively converged into a subset of 
determinants, present in every study here analysed: the level of GDP per capita, real GDP 
growth, external debt, the level of public debt and the government budget balance were 
found to predominantly explain the rating scale. In line with the results of previous 
studies, the recent work of Amstad and Packer (2015), used several explanatory variables 
as proxies for fiscal, economic and institutional strength, monetary regime, external 
position and default history and also concludes that a small set of factors can largely 
explain the rating scale. 
                                                 
8 Ratings represent a qualitative ordinal assessment of a sovereign credit risk, thus the distance between 
every two adjacent ratings may not be the same. However, an OLS regression with a linear transformation 
of the ratings assumes a constant distance between adjacent rating notches. 
9 Instead of assuming a rigid shape of the ratings scale, this model estimates the threshold values between 
rating notches, defining the shape of the ratings curve. 




To understand which factors may explain split sovereign ratings and if some of those 
factors are considered more relevant by certain agencies, we propose to analyse the 
collected dataset using a random-effects probit regression framework. 
The source of the information used to create the dependent variables were the rating 
changes obtained from Bloomberg for the three main credit rating agencies10. Afterwards, 
only long-term sovereign foreign currency ratings were kept, all the other rating changes 
were discarded11. For each country and for each year, the last rating change of the year 
was selected as that country's year rating. Years without any rating change were filled by 
extending the rating of the previous year and rating withdrawals by the rating agencies 
were ignored, since the rating given before the withdrawal keeps its relevance for the 
markets. 
The qualitative rating given by the rating agencies were then converted into a numerical 
scale, from 0 to 21, where 21 corresponded to the ‘AAA’ from S&P and Fitch/‘Aaa’ from 
Moody's and 0 corresponded to a (selective) default, using the correspondence table from 
Hill et al. (2010) shown below. According to Afonso et al. (2012), a logistic or 
exponential rating transformation provide little improvement in comparison with the 












                                                 
10 Standard & Poor’s, Moody's Investors Service and Fitch Ratings. 
11 The type of the rating changes downloaded from the Bloomberg platform was “Foreign Currency LT 
Debt”. 
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Table II A comparison between rating agencies qualitative scales. 
Rating number S&P Moody’s Fitch 
21 (Highest credit rating) AAA Aaa AAA 
20 AA+ Aa1 AA+ 
19 AA Aa2 AA 
18 AA- Aa3 AA- 
17 A+ A1 A+ 
16 A A2 A 
15 A- A3 A- 
14 BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 
13 BBB Baa2 BBB 
12 BBB- Baa3 BBB- 
11 BB+ Ba1 BB+ 
10 BB Ba2 BB 
9 BB- Ba3 BB- 
8 B+ B1 B+ 
7 B B2 B 
6 B- B3 B- 
5 CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ 
4 CCC Caa2 CCC 
3 CCC- Caa4 CCC- 
2 CC Ca CC 
1 C C C 
0 SD/D  DDD/DD/D 
Source: Hill et al. (2010). 
Note: According to S&P Global Ratings (2016), Moody’s Investors Service (2016), Fitch Ratings (2014), 
we considered a numerical sovereign rating of 12 or above to be an investment-grade rating, whereas a 
rating below that value would be considered a speculative-grade rating. 
 







SM  represent the difference in ratings between the credit rating 
agencies considered in this work. Their definition follows: 
 Diff_UPitSF. It represents the difference between the numeric ratings given by 
S&P and Fitch, when S&P rating was higher or equal than Fitch’s rating for the 
pair (country i, year t); 
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 Diff_DWitSF. It represents the difference between the numeric ratings given by 
S&P and Fitch, when S&P rating was lower or equal than Fitch’s rating for the 
pair (country i, year t); 
 Diff_UPitMF. It represents the difference between the numeric ratings given by 
Moody’s and Fitch, when Moody’s rating was higher or equal than Fitch’s rating 
for the pair (country i, year t); 
 Diff_DWitMF. It represents the difference between the numeric ratings given by 
Moody’s and Fitch, when Moody’s rating was lower or equal than Fitch’s rating 
for the pair (country i, year t); 
 Diff_UPitSM. It represents the difference between the numeric ratings given by 
S&P and Moody’s, when S&P rating was higher or equal than Moody’s rating for 
the pair (country i, year t); 
 Diff_DWitSM. It represents the difference between the numeric ratings given by 
S&P and Moody’s, when S&P rating was lower or equal than Moody’s rating for 
the pair (country i, year t) 
As an example, let Rit
X represent the rating from credit rating agency X for the country i 
in year t and consider the dependent variable Diff_UPit
SM, representing the difference 







SM > 0, then S&P considers country i, in time t, more capable of fulfilling its debt 
obligations than what Moody’s finds about the capacity of country i to pay its debt. 
This work reports on the results produced by an ordered and a simple probit models and 
as a result, the values of the dependent variables were transformed accordingly: the target 
variables of the ordered probit model may assume the values 0, 1 or 2 (as defined by 
equation (2)), whereas the target variables of the simple probit model may only assume 
the values 0 or 1 (see equation (3)). 
 
3.1 Explanatory variables 
The explanatory variables used in this study were selected according to the existing 
literature on the determinants of sovereign ratings, where we find previous papers trying 
to estimate the predictors of sovereign debt rating notations using both linear (see Cantor 
and Packer (1996), Afonso (2003), Afonso et al. (2011)) and ordered response models 
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(see Afonso et al. (2008), Afonso et al. (2011)). According to these papers, the predictors 
which better explain the rating scale are: the level of GDP per capita, real GDP growth, 
external debt, government debt and the government budget balance. 
In addition to the mentioned predictors12, this work also considered as explanatory 
variables the government structural balance, inflation and the default history of a country. 
Here follows the list of explanatory variables used in this work (Appendix 1 describes in 
more detail each one of these, along with its corresponding source and how each variable 
was created): 
 Budget balance. Overall difference between government revenues and spending. 
Sequential budget deficits may signal problems with the implemented policies; 
 Structural balance. By decomposing the budget balance into its cyclical and non-
cyclical components, one can better understand the cyclical influences on the 
budget balance. Changes in the non-cyclical, or structural, component, may be 
indicative of discretionary policy adjustments; 
 Gross debt. Summation of all liabilities that will require payments of interest 
and/or principal by the government; 
 Net debt. Net debt is calculated as gross debt minus the financial assets a 
government holds; 
 GDP growth rate. Annual growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product. A higher 
value strengths the government ability to pay its debt; 
 GDP per capita. Also called per capita income, measures the average income per 
person in a country; 
 Inflation. Annual increase of average consumer prices, over a period of time. It 
helps governments by reducing the real stock of outstanding debt in domestic 
currency, but a consistent high value is associated with macroeconomic 
imbalances; 
 External debt. Also called foreign debt, represents the total debt a country (its 
government, corporations and citizens) owes to foreign creditors. It does not 
include contingent liabilities; 
                                                 
12 With regard to the government debt, this work analysed both gross and net government debt as separate 
variables. 
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 Default-in-the-last-year/2-years/5-years/10-years. These variables represent a 
default in the last year, two, five or ten years. The definition of default by Beers 
and Mavalwalla (2016) here used is consistent with the literature on sovereign 
defaults and considers that “a default has occurred when debt service is not paid 
on the due date, payments are not made within the time frame specified under a 
guarantee or, absent an outright payment default, creditors face material economic 
losses on the sovereign debt they hold”. 
3.2 Probit regression framework 
In this work we used both a random effects ordered probit and simple probit panel model, 
similar to what Afonso et al. (2011) used to identify the determinants of sovereign debt 
credit ratings and what Al-Sakka and ap Gwilym (2010) used to analyse the impact of 
split ratings on sovereign rating changes. According to Afonso et al. (2011), the ordered 
and simple probit random-effects estimations consider the existence of an additional 
cross-country error term and therefore yield better results using panel data when 
compared with linear regression methods or fixed-effects probit estimations. 
Our approach considers the discrete, ordinal nature of rating differences between credit 
rating agencies. The negative and positive rating differences for each pair of agencies was 
analysed separately due to expected disparate behaviour, comparable to what Al-Sakka 
and ap Gwilym (2010) expected with rating migrations. 
Consider our probit regression setting, when we are regressing Diff_UPit
SM as the 
dependent variable (in this case, all observations have the rating from S&P higher or equal 
than the rating from Moody’s). If the resulting coefficient of an explanatory variable, say, 
real GDP growth, is positive and significant, we conclude that an increase in real GDP 
growth will contribute to a bigger difference between S&P and Moody’s ratings13. In a 
similar way, if the coefficient of the level of public debt is negative, we may conclude 
that an increase in the level of public debt, will contribute to a smaller difference between 
the ratings given by S&P and Moody’s14. 
                                                 
13 This could be interpreted as an increase in real GDP growth contributing to a higher S&P rating or a 
lower Moody’s rating. 
14 And in this case this could be interpreted as an increase in the level of public debt contributing to a lower 
S&P rating or a higher Moody’s rating. 
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Our probit specification is defined as follows, and the value of our 𝑦𝑖𝑡 dependent variable 
depends on whether we are considering the ordered probit or the simple probit approach: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝑅𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑃𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑥𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑍𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑖𝑡;  𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 1) 
𝑖 = 1,…𝐶 (𝑛𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠), 𝑡 = 1,…𝑌 (𝑛𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠) 
(1) 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is an ordinal variable equal to either Diff_UPit
AB or Diff_DWit
AB. 
On our ordered probit model, Diff_UPit
AB (Diff_DWit
AB) = 1 or 2 if the rating from agency 
A is higher (lower) than the rating from agency B by one or more-than-one-notch, 
respectively, for sovereign i in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
On our simple probit model, Diff_UPit
AB (Diff_DWit
AB) = 1 if the rating from agency A is 
higher (lower) than the rating from agency B by one or more notches, for sovereign i in 
year t, and 0 otherwise. 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑖𝑡 may assume the variation value of the budget balance, gross debt, net 
debt or structural balance of country i in year t, depending on the chosen specification15. 
𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝑅𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 is the growth rate of GDP for country i in year t. 
𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the GDP per capita variation for country i in year t. 
𝑃𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 is the inflation percentage change for country i in year t. 
𝐸𝑥𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 is the external debt variation for country i in year t. 
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the country i in year t had 
defaulted in the last Z years, and 0 otherwise. 
In the scope of the ordered probit framework, our six dependent variables were defined 
as to only have values of 1, 2 or 0, representing a rating gap of 1-notch, 2-or-more-notches 
or the inexistence of a rating gap, respectively. Equation 2 represents how the target 

























𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝛼 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽 ∈ {𝑆𝐹,𝑀𝐹, 𝑆𝑀}. 
(2) 
                                                 
15 All specifications are defined on Table III. 
. 
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A simple probit regression was also run afterwards, and so the dependent variables were 




















𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝛼 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽 ∈ {𝑆𝐹,𝑀𝐹, 𝑆𝑀}. 
(3) 
This leads to, in the context of the simple probit regression, our dependent variables 
having a value of 1 if there is a rating difference of 1-notch or higher and a value of 0 if 
the ratings from the considered pair of agencies are equivalent in our numerical rating 
scale. 
Four different specifications of predicting variables were considered to overcome the 
correlation between some of the variables. Within each specification, the four different 
default dummies were combined. The composition of each specification can be seen on 
following table. 
Table III Composition of the specifications used in this work, combining the different predicting 
variables. These specifications were used with both the ordered probit and the simple probit 
models. 
Specification Predicting variables 
Budget 
balance 
BudgetBal_NGDP, NGDP_RPCH, NGDPDPC, PCPIPCH, ExtDebtPercGNI, DefaultLastY 
BudgetBal_NGDP, NGDP_RPCH, NGDPDPC, PCPIPCH, ExtDebtPercGNI, DefaultLast2Y 
BudgetBal_NGDP, NGDP_RPCH, NGDPDPC, PCPIPCH, ExtDebtPercGNI, DefaultLast5Y 
BudgetBal_NGDP, NGDP_RPCH, NGDPDPC, PCPIPCH, ExtDebtPercGNI, DefaultLast10Y 
Gross debt GGXWDG_NGDP, NGDP_RPCH, NGDPDPC, PCPIPCH, ExtDebtPercGNI, DefaultLastY 
GGXWDG_NGDP, NGDP_RPCH, NGDPDPC, PCPIPCH, ExtDebtPercGNI, DefaultLast2Y 
GGXWDG_NGDP, NGDP_RPCH, NGDPDPC, PCPIPCH, ExtDebtPercGNI, DefaultLast5Y 
GGXWDG_NGDP, NGDP_RPCH, NGDPDPC, PCPIPCH, ExtDebtPercGNI, DefaultLast10Y 
Net debt GGXWDN_NGDP, NGDP_RPCH, NGDPDPC, PCPIPCH, ExtDebtPercGNI, DefaultLastY 
GGXWDN_NGDP, NGDP_RPCH, NGDPDPC, PCPIPCH, ExtDebtPercGNI, DefaultLast2Y 
GGXWDN_NGDP, NGDP_RPCH, NGDPDPC, PCPIPCH, ExtDebtPercGNI, DefaultLast5Y 
GGXWDN_NGDP, NGDP_RPCH, NGDPDPC, PCPIPCH, ExtDebtPercGNI, DefaultLast10Y 





GGSB_NPGDP, NGDP_RPCH, NGDPDPC, PCPIPCH, ExtDebtPercGNI, DefaultLastY 
GGSB_NPGDP, NGDP_RPCH, NGDPDPC, PCPIPCH, ExtDebtPercGNI, DefaultLast2Y 
GGSB_NPGDP, NGDP_RPCH, NGDPDPC, PCPIPCH, ExtDebtPercGNI, DefaultLast5Y 
GGSB_NPGDP, NGDP_RPCH, NGDPDPC, PCPIPCH, ExtDebtPercGNI, DefaultLast10Y 
4 Empirical analysis 
4.1 Data 
With regards to the dependent variables, all the sovereign rating changes16 were 
downloaded from Bloomberg and converted into a numerical scale using Table II. 
Afterwards, we created six dependent variables (described in section 3), two variables for 
each rating agency pair, with the value of each variable reflecting the numerical rating 
difference between the ratings given by those specific agencies (comparable to what 
Livingston et al. (2008) did with the split rated issues). 
Figure 2 Total number of countries rated by at least two credit rating agencies, and number of 
countries rated by each pair of the rating agencies considered in this work. 
Source: rating agencies and own calculations. 
 
The initial objective of this work was to study rating differences from 1970 onwards. 
However, and due to the inexistence of both macroeconomic values for many countries 
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on those early years and ratings from at least two of the three selected agencies, our 
observations happened to comprehend only the period between 1980 and 2015. As Figure 
2 illustrates, we only have observations with a rating from Fitch from 1994 onwards. 
From 1990 and until 2000, we observe a bigger increase in the number or countries rated 
by at least two agencies, whereas from 2000 onwards the pace of this increase slowed, 
ending with 105 countries in our dataset with ratings from at least two of the main rating 
agencies. 
The distribution of the sovereign ratings on our dataset (seen in Figure 3) show that S&P 
is the agency which assigns more countries a rating of ‘AA-’ or above, and that the great 
majority of our observations are equal or above ‘B-’. A higher degree of agreement on 
the top of the rating scale may explain the number of observations which had a rating of 
‘AAA’ from all three agencies. 
Figure 3 Distribution of the sovereign ratings composing our dataset. The time periods are 1980 
to 2015 for S&P and Moody’s and 1994 to 2015 for Fitch. 
 
Source: rating agencies and own calculations. 
In Table IV one may find some of the countries analysed in the scope of this work. The 
higher number of countries added to our observations in 1995 and 2000 reflect the 
behaviour of the total number of countries already seen on Figure 3. 
Our independent variables were obtained from datasets from the IMF (World Economic 
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Sovereign Defaults) and from the Quarterly External Debt Statistics dataset developed in 
collaboration between the World Bank and the IMF. Details on how those variables were 
created can be found in Table A1-1. 
Table IV Countries in our full dataset which in the previous period did not have ratings from two 
or more of the three main agencies. 
 
Source: rating agencies and own calculations. 
4.2 Ordered probit panel results 
This section will dissect the results generated by the ordered probit panel regression for 
the rating differences between every pair of rating agencies. We first considered the full 
dataset in our regressions. Then, our dataset was split into two subsets depending on the 
value of the average rating from each pair of rating agencies: a set with investment-grade 
average ratings and a set with speculative-grade average ratings. We ran the ordered 
probit regressions with the three datasets, for each of the four specifications of predicting 
variables. 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Australia Denmark Argentina Barbados Bahrain Albania Angola
Austria Finland Belgium Belize Cameroon Azerbaijan Armenia
United Kingdom Ireland Brazil Bulgaria Dominican Republic Belarus Côte d'Ivoire
Norway Malaysia Canada Costa Rica El Salvador Bosnia and Herzegovina Ethiopia
Sweden New Zealand Chile Croatia Ghana Fiji Honduras
Spain China Ecuador Guatemala Gabon Iraq
Thailand Colombia Egypt Mali Georgia Namibia
Czech Republic Estonia Mongolia Jordan Paraguay
France India Mozambique Kenya Rwanda
Germany Jamaica Saudi Arabia Libya Senegal
Greece Kazakhstan Serbia Nigeria Zambia
Hungary Korea (Republic of) Sri Lanka Seychelles
Iceland Kuwait Ukraine Uganda
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4.2.1 Full sample 
We started by running the ordered probit regression with the full dataset. This dataset was 
composed by more than 850 observations for each dependent variable, comprised a period 
of at least 22 years (36 years only for the rating agency pair S&P and Moody’s) and 69 
or more countries. More than 65% of our observations for each of our target variables had 
no rating difference, whereas a rating difference of 1-notch was found at least in 19% of 
the observations. A rating difference of two or more notches can only be found 3.5%17 of 
the times when analysing comparable ratings from S&P and Fitch; on the other hand, 
9%18 of the observations about the rating differences between S&P and Moody’s have a 
2-notch rating difference. This shows how S&P and Moody’s disagree more when 
compared with the other rating agency pairs. Table V summarizes the full dataset. 
Table V Summary of the full dataset, divided by the six target variables. 
 Diff_UPitSF Diff_DWitSF Diff_UPitMF Diff_DWitMF Diff_UPitSM Diff_DWitSM 
No. of countries 87 87 70 69 82 82 
No. of years 22 22 22 22 36 36 
First and last year 1994-2015 1994-2015 1994-2015 1994-2015 1980-2015 1980-2015 
No. of observations 1149 1194 903 851 1103 1165 
Observations with:       
Rating difference = 0 898 (78%) 898 (75%) 606 (67%) 606 (71%) 764 (69%) 764 (66%) 
Rating difference = 1 221 (19%) 248 (21%) 223 (25%) 187 (22%) 247 (22%) 286 (25%) 
Rating difference = 2 30 (3%) 48 (4%) 74 (8%) 58 (7%) 92 (8%) 115 (10%) 
No. of observations with 
a value: 
      
GDP per capita 1149 
(100%) 
1194 (100%) 903 (100%) 851 (100%) 1103 
(100%) 
1165 (100%) 
Real GDP growth rate 1148 
(100%) 
1194 (100%) 903 (100%) 851 (100%) 1103 
(100%) 
1165 (100%) 
                                                 
17 This value was obtained by calculating the average of the percentages of a rating difference of two or 
more notches between S&P and Fitch, when the first gave a higher rating than the latter (Diff_UPitSF) and 
when the first gave a lower rating than the latter (Diff_DWitSF). 
18 This value was obtained by calculating the average of the percentages of a rating difference of two or 
more notches between S&P and Moody’s, when the first gave a higher rating than the latter (Diff_UPitSM) 
and when the first gave a lower rating than the latter (Diff_DWitSM). 
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External debt 841 (73%) 897 (75%) 685 (76%) 648 (76%) 701 (64%) 808 (69%) 
Gov. gross debt 1096 
(95%) 
1135 (95%) 865 (96%) 807 (95%) 1018 
(92%) 
1065 (91%) 
Gov. net debt 1046 
(91%) 
1085 (91%) 822 (91%) 770 (90%) 954 (86%) 1004 (86%) 
Budget balance 1112 
(97%) 
1153 (97%) 877 (97%) 824 (97%) 1057 
(96%) 
1104 (95%) 
Structural balance 1064 
(93%) 
1100 (92%) 842 (93%) 774 (91%) 970 (88%) 1028 (88%) 
Inflation 1147 
(100%) 
1191 (100%) 901 (100%) 848 (100%) 1100 
(100%) 
1160 (100%) 
Default in the:       
Last year 312 (27%) 321 (27%) 164 (18%) 211 (25%) 268 (24%) 258 (22%) 
Last two years 349 (30%) 363 (30%) 190 (21%) 247 (29%) 311 (28%) 297 (25%) 
Last five years 419 (36%) 446 (37%) 248 (27%) 313 (37%) 379 (34%) 375 (32%) 
Last ten years 522 (45%) 539 (45%) 331 (37%) 366 (43%) 448 (41%) 454 (39%) 
Source: rating agencies and own calculations. 
 
Running the ordered probit regression for the full dataset, when the ratings from S&P are 
higher or equal to Fitch own ratings (Diff_UPit
SF dependent variable), we get significant 
values for both budget balance and net debt variables. When budget balance increases, 
we expect the rating difference to decrease. For the net debt predicting variable the 
opposite occurs: when its value increases, the rating difference increases as well. 
With regard to the Diff_DWit
SF dependent variable (ratings from S&P being lower or equal 
to Fitch ratings), GDP per capita, external debt and the dummy default-in-the-last-5-years 
variables have statistically significant coefficients on all specifications. One can then 
conclude that if GDP per capita or external debt decrease, the rating difference between 
those two rating agencies increases. The coefficients of the dummy default-in-the-last-5-
years are also significant (and positive), showing that a default in the last five years 
increases the rating difference between S&P and Fitch in this case. 
Analysing the rating difference between Moody's and Fitch, when the rating given by 
Moody's is higher than Fitch’s rating (Diff_UPit
MF), we find significant values for two 
dependent variables, GDP growth (negative coefficient on two specifications) and 
external debt level (positive coefficients on all specifications). These results show that 
when GDP growth increases, the rating difference between these two agencies becomes 
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smaller, whereas when the level of external debt increases, the gap between these two 
agencies increases. 
When Moody's rating is lower than the rating from Fitch (Diff_DWit
MF), we find that the 
dummy variable representing a default in the last five years has a positive coefficient in 
all specifications. For this reason, if a default in the last five years occurred, the rating 
difference in this setting between Moody's and Fitch increases as well.  
The variables gross debt and net debt also have significant values of opposite signs: the 
gross debt contributes negatively for the rating difference, reducing the rating difference 
when its value increases, while the net debt has positive coefficients, so its increase is 
expected to positively influence the magnitude of the rating difference. We need to better 
understand the opposite signs of these two variables, since they should be correlated to a 
certain degree. The separate regressions of the investment and speculative ratings may 
shed some light into this topic. 
The results from regressing our dependent variable Diff_UPit
SM (when the S&P rating is 
higher than Moody's rating), display significant results only for the dummy default 
variables. The dummy default-in-the-last-2-years has positive coefficients on all 
specifications, meaning that if a country defaults in the last two years, the rating gap 
between S&P and Moody's will grow. 
The results from regressing the last set of specifications, when the rating from S&P is 
lower than the rating from Moody's (Diff_UPit
SM dependent variable), show that the 
budget balance, gross debt, GDP growth and GDP per capita variables all contribute to 
the rating difference in question. Those first three variables have statistically significant 
and positive coefficients, meaning that when one of those variables increase, the rating 
difference between S&P and Moody's (Diff_UPit
SM) will increase as well. The coefficient 
of the GDP per capita variable is negative, so when its value increases, the rating gap 
between S&P and Moody's becomes smaller. 
The main results of running the ordered probit regressions with our full dataset are shown 
in the table below, and the full results may be seen on Appendix 2: 
Table VI Summary of the regressions of the ordered probit full dataset. 
 Significant variables Marginal Effect 
Rating difference = 1 
Marginal Effect 
Rating difference = 2 
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Diff_UPitSF (-) Budget balance (4/4) 





Diff_DWitSF (-) GDP per capita (16/16) 
(-) External debt (16/16) 
(+) Default last 1Y (1/4) 
(+) Default last 2Y (1/4) 











Diff_UPitMF (-) GDP growth (9/16) 





Diff_DWitMF (-) Gross debt (2/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(+) Default last 2Y (3/4) 









Diff_UPitSM (+) Default last Y (1/4) 
(+) Default last 2Y (4/4) 
(+) Default last 5Y (1/4) 









Diff_DWitSM (+) Budget balance (4/4) 
(+) Gross debt (4/4) 
(+) GDP growth (4/16) 









Note: Coefficient signs and number of significant regressions (besides the total number of run regressions) 
in parenthesis. 
 
4.2.2 Differentiation between investment and speculative ratings 
We will now report the ordered probit regression results when the observations used as 
input were divided into two subsets, depending on the value of the average rating given 
by the rating agency pair. The observations with a numeric average rating of 12 or more19 
were grouped in the investment-grade subset, whereas those with a numeric rating less 
than 12 were grouped in the speculative-grade subset. 
4.2.2.1 Investment-grade subset 
This section will analyse the results from the ordered probit regression when considering 
only observations with an investment-grade average rating. When compared with the full 
dataset, the investment-grade dataset had observations for a smaller number of countries, 
                                                 
19 Corresponding to ‘BBB-’ for S&P and Fitch or to ‘Baa3’ for Moody’s. 
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between 49 and 57 different countries. The adopted criteria of considering only those 
observations with an investment-grade average rating reduced as expected the number of 
observations for each target variable (all target variables had less than 800 observations). 
It’s important to note a higher percentage of observations with the same rating (when 
compared with the full dataset) from each rating agency in this setting, reflecting a greater 
coherence between the studied rating agencies when considering investment-grade 
sovereigns. This may be explained by Livingston et al. (2007) opaqueness idea which 
associates bond split ratings with the opaqueness of the issuer. In this case, investment-
grade sovereign issuers disclose more detailed information, allowing rating agencies to 
better evaluate their ability to service debt and therefore rating agencies will agree more 
often about a country’s rating in this context, leading to a higher percentage of 
observations with a rating difference of 0. Table VII summarizes the dataset used in this 
section. 
Our regression, when the S&P rating is higher than the rating from Fitch (Diff_UPit
SF 
dependent variable), only yield significant results for one of the specifications (only one 
of the regressions show the budget balance variable as significant). This specification 
shows a positive correlation between government net debt and the observed rating 
difference, when the ratings from S&P and Fitch are investment-grade. 
When the rating from S&P is lower than the one from Fitch (Diff_DWit
SF), the obtained 
results for all specifications show a negative correlation between GDP per capita and the 
rating difference. This means that when GDP per capita increases, the rating difference is 
reduced. Only one of the regressions in this setting shows a significant and positive 
default dummy variable (the last year one). 
Table VII Summary of the investment-grade dataset, divided by the six target variables. 
 Diff_UPitSF Diff_DWitSF Diff_UPitMF Diff_DWitMF Diff_UPitSM Diff_DWitSM 
No. of countries 57 56 50 49 52 52 
No. of years 22 22 22 22 36 36 
First and last year 1994-2015 1994-2015 1994-2015 1994-2015 1980-2015 1980-2015 
No. of observations 773 759 665 555 746 795 
Observations with:       
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Rating difference = 0 634 (82%) 634 (84%) 466 (70%) 466 (84%) 568 (76%) 568 (71%) 
Rating difference = 1 124 (16%) 112 (15%) 145 (22%) 64 (12%) 124 (17%) 157 (20%) 
Rating difference = 2 15 (2%) 13 (2%) 54 (8%) 25 (5%) 54 (7%) 70 (9%) 
No. of observations 
with a value: 
      
GDP per capita 773 
(100%) 
759 (100%) 665 (100%) 555 (100%) 746 (100%) 795 (100%) 
Real GDP growth rate 772 
(100%) 
759 (100%) 665 (100%) 555 (100%) 746 (100%) 795 (100%) 
External debt 491 (64%) 491 (65%) 462 (69%) 370 (67%) 378 (51%) 472 (59%) 
Gov. gross debt 750 (97%) 735 (97%) 655 (99%) 544 (98%) 693 (93%) 734 (92%) 
Gov. net debt 700 (91%) 675 (89%) 605 (91%) 499 (90%) 641 (86%) 673 (85%) 
Budget balance 753 (97%) 738 (97%) 658 (99%) 547 (99%) 717 (96%) 760 (96%) 
Structural balance 727 (94%) 713 (94%) 643 (97%) 528 (95%) 661 (89%) 709 (89%) 
Inflation 772 
(100%) 
759 (100%) 665 (100%) 555 (100%) 746 (100%) 795 (100%) 
Default in the:       
Last year 74 (10%) 66 (9%) 46 (7%) 42 (8%) 56 (8%) 56 (7%) 
Last two years 87 (11%) 76 (10%) 55 (8%) 52 (9%) 65 (9%) 63 (8%) 
Last five years 117 (15%) 104 (14%) 77 (12%) 73 (13%) 88 (12%) 87 (11%) 
Last ten years 177 (23%) 153 (20%) 124 (19%) 104 (19%) 127 (17%) 130 (16%) 
Source: rating agencies and own calculations. 
 
The regressions of our dependent variable Diff_UPit
MF (rating from Moody's higher than 
the one from Fitch, with the average classified as investment-grade) showed a positive 
and negative correlation between the rating difference and, respectively, GDP per capita 
and inflation. In this case, when GDP per capita increases, the rating gap increases, 
whereas with an inflation increase, the rating divergence between those two agencies will 
diminish. 
While analysing the results when we regress the Diff_DWit
MF (rating difference when the 
rating from Moody's is lower than the rating from Fitch), we only find one of the 
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regressions showing a significant coefficient for the government gross debt predicting 
variable. 
All the regressions of the Diff_UPit
SM target variable (rating difference when the rating 
from S&P is higher than the rating from Moody's, and, on average, both ratings are 
investment-grade) show a significant negative correlation between external debt and the 
rating difference, leading to a smaller rating difference when the level of external debt 
rises. 
The last dependent variable, Diff_DWit
SM, yield significant results when regressed against 
our predicting variables: both budget balance and government gross debt have significant 
positive coefficients20, meaning that an increase of those variables will lead to an increase 
in the rating difference between S&P and Moody's, when the rating of the first is lower 
than the rating of the latter. 
The GDP growth predicting variable also has significant positive coefficients on two of 
the four regressed specifications, showing an effect on the rating difference similar to the 
described effect of the budget balance and government gross debt on the rating gap. We 
also observe statistically significant and negative coefficients for two of the default 
dummy variables21, meaning that the existence of a default in the last year or two will 
contribute to a smaller rating difference between S&P and Moody's in this case. 
The following table summarizes the significant results obtained when regressing the 
investment-grade subset (the full results may be consulted in Appendix 3): 
Table VIII Summary of the regressions of the ordered probit investment-grade subset. 
 Significant variables Marginal Effect 
Rating difference = 1 
Marginal Effect 
Rating difference = 2 
Diff_UPitSF (-) Budget balance (1/4) 





Diff_DWitSF (-) GDP per capita (15/16) 





Diff_UPitMF (+) GDP per capita (12/16) 





Diff_DWitMF (-) Gross debt (1/4) -0.1% -0.02% 
Diff_UPitSM (-) External debt (16/16) -0.2%--0.3% -0.04% 
                                                 
20 With a significance level of 1% for all the relevant regressions. 
21 Default in the last year and in the last two years. 
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Diff_DWitSM (+) Budget balance (4/4) 
(+) Gross debt (4/4) 
(+) GDP growth (8/16) 
(-) Default last 1Y (4/4) 











Note: Coefficient signs and number of significant regressions (besides the total number of run regressions) 
in parenthesis. 
 
4.2.2.2 Speculative-grade subset 
Lastly, the results from the ordered probit regression using the same specifications will 
be analysed, but this time using a subset of the full dataset composed only by observations 
with a speculative-grade average rating. This speculative-grade subset has observations 
for at least 38 countries22 and comprehends the period from 1992 to 2015. We have much 
less observations (between 238 and 435 observations) for the speculative-grade dataset 
when compared with the investment-grade and full datasets. By analysing Table IX we 
can observe that the same rating can only be found on 70% of the observations for the 
Diff_UPit
SF target variable, reaching as low as 47% of the observations for the rating 
differences between Moody’s and Fitch, when the rating from the first is lower than the 
rating from the latter. This fact reflects how opaque speculative-grade sovereigns are and 
how difficult is for credit rating agencies to assess the real capability of these sovereigns 
to service their debt. This lack of transparency leads to the information available to rating 
agencies having poor quality and increases the probability of a split rating (Al-Sakka and 
ap Gwilym (2010)). 
The following table summarizes the dataset used in this section. 
Table IX Summary of the speculative-grade dataset, divided by the six target variables. 
 Diff_UPitSF Diff_DWitSF Diff_UPitMF Diff_DWitMF Diff_UPitSM Diff_DWitSM 
No. of countries 54 53 42 38 50 51 
No. of years 22 22 22 22 23 24 
First and last year 1994-2015 1994-2015 1994-2015 1994-2015 1993-2015 1992-2015 
No. of observations 376 435 238 296 357 370 
Observations with:       
                                                 
22 For the Diff_DWitMF target variable; the remaining target variables include observations for more than 50 
countries. 
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Rating difference = 0 264 (70%) 264 (61%) 140 (59%) 140 (47%) 196 (55%) 196 (53%) 
Rating difference = 1 97 (26%) 136 (31%) 78 (33%) 123 (42%) 123 (34%) 129 (35%) 
Rating difference = 2 15 (4%) 35 (8%) 20 (8%) 33 (11%) 38 (11%) 45 (12%) 
No. of observations 
with a value: 
      
GDP per capita 376 
(100%) 
435 (100%) 238 (100%) 296 (100%) 357 
(100%) 
370 (100%) 




435 (100%) 238 (100%) 296 (100%) 357 
(100%) 
370 (100%) 
External debt 350 (93%) 406 (93%) 223 (94%) 278 (94%) 323 (90%) 336 (91%) 
Gov. gross debt 346 (92%) 400 (92%) 210 (88%) 263 (89%) 325 (91%) 331 (89%) 
Gov. net debt 346 (92%) 410 (94%) 217 (91%) 271 (92%) 313 (88%) 331 (89%) 
Budget balance 359 (95%) 415 (95%) 219 (92%) 277 (94%) 340 (95%) 344 (93%) 
Structural balance 337 (90%) 387 (89%) 199 (84%) 246 (83%) 309 (87%) 319 (86%) 
Inflation 375 
(100%) 
432 (99%) 236 (99%) 293 (99%) 354 (99%) 365 (99%) 
Default in the:       
Last year 238 (63%) 255 (59%) 118 (50%) 169 (57%) 212 (59%) 202 (55%) 
Last two years 262 (70%) 287 (66%) 135 (57%) 195 (66%) 246 (69%) 234 (63%) 
Last five years 302 (80%) 342 (79%) 171 (72%) 240 (81%) 291 (82%) 288 (78%) 
Last ten years 345 (92%) 986 (89%) 207 (87%) 262 (89%) 321 (90%) 324 (88%) 
Source: rating agencies and own calculations. 
The first regressions have the Diff_UPit
SF as the dependent variable and produce 
significant results for the budget balance and government net debt variables (only one of 
the regressions with this target variable show the dummy default-in-the-last-5-years 
variable as significant). The budget balance coefficient is negative, leading to a smaller 
rating difference between S&P and Fitch when the budget balance grows. Government 
net debt has the opposite effect on the described rating difference: when it increases, the 
rating disparity between those two agencies increases as well. 
With regards to the obtained results when regressing the Diff_DWit
SF variable, it is 
possible to observe that government net debt, GDP growth, external debt level and the 
dummy default-in-the-last-10-years variables all have an effect on the rating difference 
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between S&P and Fitch, when the rating from the first is lower than the rating from the 
latter. The government net debt variable has a positive coefficient, increasing the rating 
difference when its value increases. The remaining significant variables (GDP growth, 
external debt level and the dummy default variable) have negative coefficients, so when 
their value increases (or becomes one, in the case of the dummy variable), the rating 
difference between S&P and Fitch shrinks. 
Only one of the specifications yield significant results when regressing the Diff_UPit
MF 
variable (rating difference between Moody's and Fitch, with a higher rating from the first 
agency). External debt has positive and significant coefficients on two of the regressions, 
therefore when its value increases, the analysed rating difference increases as well. Two 
of the four dummy default variables (default in the last year and in the last five years) 
have significant negative coefficients, thus when a default happened in the last year or in 
the last five years, the rating difference will get smaller. 
The regression of the Diff_DWit
MF target variable against the different specifications of 
predicting variables highlights the effect of government gross debt and inflation on the 
rating difference between Moody's and Fitch, when the first is lower than the latter (the 
dummy default-in-the-last-10-years variable only yielded significant and negative results 
for one of the regressions). Both gross debt and inflation contribute negatively to the 
rating gap, therefore, the rating difference will shrink if one of those variables increases. 
Table X Summary of the regressions of the ordered probit speculative-grade subset. 
 Significant variables 
(Coefficient sign) 
Marginal Effect 
Rating difference = 1 
Marginal Effect 
Rating difference = 2 
Diff_UPitSF (-) Budget balance (4/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 







Diff_DWitSF (+) Net debt (4/4) 
(-) GDP growth (15/16) 
(-) External debt (15/16) 









Diff_UPitMF (+) External debt (2/16) 
(-) Default last Y (1/4) 







Diff_DWitMF (-) Gross debt (4/4) -0.3% -0.1%--0.2% 
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(-) Inflation (4/4) 





Diff_UPitSM (-) Net debt (4/4) -0.2% -0.06% 
Diff_DWitSM (+) Budget balance (3/4) 
(-) GDP per capita (12/16) 







Note: Coefficient signs and number of significant regressions (besides the total number of run regressions) 
in parenthesis. 
 
All the ordered probit regressions run with Diff_UPit
SM as the dependent variable show 
that the government net debt contributes negatively to the rating difference, when the 
S&P rating is higher than the rating from Moody's. As a result, when the government net 
debt increases, the rating gap between S&P and Moody's shrinks. 
The results from regressing the Diff_DWit
SM target variable show a positive and a negative 
correlation between the rating difference (when the rating from S&P is lower than the one 
from Moody's) and, respectively, the budget balance on one hand, and GDP per capita 
and external debt on the other hand. For this reason, when the budget balance increases, 
the considered rating gap increases; whereas, when GDP per capita or external debt 
increase, the same rating gap decreases. 
Table X summarizes the significant results obtained when regressing the speculative-
grade subset (Appendix 4 contains the full results). 
 
4.3 Simple probit panel results 







SM) with the ordered probit framework, we found 
that only 3% to 10% of our observations had a rating gap of 2-notches or higher (this can 
be seen on the summary of Table V). Therefore, we decided to run a simple probit 
regression for the same observations subsets already used: we first considered the full 
dataset, and afterwards we split it into two subsets (an investment-grade and a 
speculative-grade dataset) depending on the average rating of the observation. 
The following sections will report on the results of our regressions using a simple probit 
approach and the same data as before. 
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4.3.1 Full sample 
Regressing our target variables with a simple probit model produced significant results 
for all specifications23. 
Our regressions, when the ratings from S&P are higher than Fitch own ratings, show that 
both budget balance and government net debt have an effect on the rating difference 
between those two agencies. In the first case, when the budget balance grows, the rating 
difference shrinks (meaning that S&P would downgrade their rating or Fitch will upgrade 
theirs), whereas when the government net debt increases, the rating difference will 
increase as well (by means of an upgrade from S&P or a downgrade from Fitch). 
The results of regressing Diff_DWit
SF highlight the influence of GDP per capita and the 
dummy default-in-the-last-5-years variable24. When GDP per capita grows, S&P and 
Fitch will update their ratings, resulting in a smaller rating difference. The opposite 
happens when there is a default in the last five years: in this case, the rating disagreement 
between those two agencies will grow. 
Our regressions also produce significant results when a positive rating difference between 
Moody’s and Fitch (represented by the Diff_UPit
MF dependent variable) exists. All the 
regressions show a positive correlation between external debt and the rating difference 
(so when external debt increases, the rating gap gets bigger as well). 
The structural balance variable also impacts on the rating difference, because of its 
significant and negative coefficients. When structural balance increases for a given 
country, we can expect the rating difference between Moody’s and Fitch to become 
smaller. 
The regressions of our Diff_DWit
MF dependent variable show that government net debt 
and two of the dummy default variables are all positively correlated with the rating 
difference. As a consequence, when a country’s net debt increases or a default happens 
in the last two or five years, we may expect a bigger rating difference between Moody’s 
and Fitch. 
The results of regressing the Diff_UPit
SM dependent variable only produce significant 
coefficients for one of the specifications. In the specification no. 4, the external debt 
                                                 
23 The full dataset used in this section was already described on section 4.2.1. 
24 The last specification also yields significant and positive coefficients for the dummy default-in-the-last-
year and default-in-the-last-2-years variables. 
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predicting variable had a significant and negative coefficient for all the regressions, so 
when its value increased, the rating difference between S&P and Moody’s would become 
smaller. Two regressions of this specification also exposed the positive correlation 
between a default in the last five or 10 years and an increase of the rating difference. 
Finally, the simple probit regressions of the Diff_DWit
SM variable reveal a positive 
correlation between the rating difference and each one of the budget balance, government 
gross debt and GDP growth dependent variables. Therefore, when one of the previous 
variables increases, one may expect a bigger rating gap between S&P and Moody’s. In 
contrast, and derived from the significant and negative coefficients of the GDP per capita 
variable, when its value increases, one may expect the ratings from S&P and Moody’s to 
converge. 
We can find in the following table a summary of the significant results obtained when 
regressing this full dataset (the full results can be seen on Appendix 5): 
Table XI Summary of the simple probit regressions of the full dataset. 
 Significant variables 
(Coefficient sign) 
Marginal Effect 
Rating difference = 1 
Diff_UPitSF (-) Budget balance (4/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
-0.002% 
0.0004% 
Diff_DWitSF (-) GDP per capita (16/16) 
(+) Default last Y (1/4) 
(+) Default last 2Y (1/4) 





Diff_UPitMF (-) Structural balance (3/4) 
(+) External debt (16/16) 
-1.6%--1.7% 
0.2% 
Diff_DWitMF (+) Net debt (4/4) 
(+) Default last 2Y (3/4) 




Diff_UPitSM (-) External debt (4/16) 
(+) Default last 5Y (1/4) 




Diff_DWitSM (+) Budget balance (4/4) 
(+) Gross debt (4/4) 
(+) GDP growth (4/16) 





Note: Coefficient signs and number of significant regressions (besides the total number of run regressions) 
in parenthesis. 




4.3.2 Differentiation between investment and speculative ratings 
As previously done using the ordered probit framework, we will now report on the simple 
probit results when the observations were divided into two subsets, an investment-grade 
subset and a speculative-grade subset. 
4.3.2.1 Investment-grade subset 
This section will analyse the results from the simple probit regressions using the 
investment-grade subset25. 
The regressions of our Diff_UPit
SF target variable only showed positive and significant 
coefficients for the government net debt variable. For this reason, when the government 
net debt increases, one can expect a bigger rating difference between S&P and Fitch. 
When analysing the results of regressing our observations when the rating from S&P was 
lower or equal to the rating from Fitch (i.e., Diff_DWit
SF dependent variable), we found 
that both GDP per capita and inflation have significant coefficient values with opposite 
signs26. While an increase of GDP per capita will decrease the rating difference, an 
inflation increase will contribute to a bigger rating difference between those two agencies. 
Our regressions of the variable Diff_UPit
MF showed that budget balance, structural 
balance, inflation and the dummy variable default-in-the-last-10-years all have negative 
and significant coefficients. Thus, with an increase of those variables (or the existence of 
a default in the last ten years), one may expect a reduction in the rating gap between 
Moody’s and Fitch, in this context. We also found two regressions producing positive and 
significant coefficients for the GDP per capita variable. 
By regressing our observations when Moody’s rating is lower than Fitch own rating (i.e., 
when regressing Diff_DWit
MF), we found that government net debt had positive 
coefficients for all the regressions using it. On the other hand, only one of the regressions 
disclosed a negative coefficient for the government gross debt variable. With this in mind, 
one may expect an increase of the rating difference when net debt increases, while an 
increase of the government gross debt will shrink the rating difference. 
                                                 
25 This subset was described previously on section 4.2.2.1, when we applied the ordered probit framework 
to the investment-grade subset. 
26 Only one of the regressions showed a positive coefficient for the dummy variable representing a country 
default in the last year. 
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We find that both external debt and GDP per capita variables have significant and 
negative coefficients when regressing those observations with a higher rating from S&P 
than from Moody’s (Diff_UPit
SM dependent variable). As a result, when one of those 
variables increases, the rating gap between S&P and Moody’s will get smaller. 
Lastly, our regressions of the Diff_DWit
SM target variable yield significant results for three 
of the four dummy default variables (default in the last year, two and five years), structural 
balance, GDP growth, budget balance and government gross debt variables. The 
structural balance and the default in the last year/2-years/5-years dummy predicting 
variables have a negative coefficient, leading to a smaller rating difference between S&P 
and Moody’s when they increase. On the other hand, the remaining variables (GDP 
growth, budget balance and the government gross debt) have positive coefficients, 
increasing the considered rating gap when they increase. 
A brief overview of the results obtained with our simple probit regressions applied to the 
investment-grade dataset can be seen in the following table (the full results are in 
Appendix 6): 
Table XII Summary of the simple probit regressions of the investment-grade dataset. 
 Significant variables 
(Coefficient sign) 
Marginal Effect 
Rating difference = 1 
Diff_UPitSF (+) Net debt (4/4) 0.0002% 
Diff_DWitSF (-) GDP per capita (12/16) 
(+) Inflation (13/16) 




Diff_UPitMF (-) Budget balance (1/4) 
(-) Structural balance (4/4) 
(+) GDP per capita (2/16) 
(-) Inflation (13/16) 






Diff_DWitMF (-) Gross debt (1/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
-0.2% 
0.0002% 
Diff_UPitSM (-) GDP per capita (8/16) 
(-) External debt (16/16) 
-0.2%--0.3% 
-0.3%--0.4% 
Diff_DWitSM (+) Budget balance (4/4) 
(-) Structural balance (2/4) 
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(+) GDP growth (13/16) 
(-) Default last Y (4/4) 
(-) Default last 2Y (4/4) 





Note: Coefficient signs and number of significant regressions (besides the total number of run regressions) 
in parenthesis. 
 
4.3.2.2 Speculative-grade subset 
Our simple probit regressions of the speculative-grade dataset produced significant results 
across all the sovereign rating difference target variables27. 
By regressing the Diff_UPit
SF target variable with the speculative-grade dataset, we find 
that the budget balance and government net debt variables both have significant 
coefficients. In the first case, when the budget balance grows, the rating difference 
between S&P and Fitch becomes smaller. In the latter case, the government net debt has 
a positive coefficient, so when it grows, the rating gap is expected to grow as well. Two 
of these regressions also show significant and negative coefficients for the dummy 
variables representing a default in the last two and five years, so when a default in this 
conditions happens, the rating difference between S&P and Fitch will become smaller. 
The results of regressing the Diff_DWit
SF target variable show that GDP growth and three 
of the four dummy default variables (representing a default in the last year, two or ten 
years) contribute to a smaller rating difference between S&P and Fitch, when the rating 
from the first is lower than the rating from the latter, whereas the government net debt 
variable has a significant and positive correlation with the rating difference, triggering a 
bigger rating difference when its value grows. 
In contrast to the regressions of the great majority of our target variables, the simple probit 
regressions of the Diff_UPit
MF variable only produced significant coefficients for two of 
the regressions: the negative coefficients of the dummy variables representing a default 
in the last year and in the last five years show how a default in those past periods will 
contribute to a smaller rating gap between Moody’s and Fitch, when the rating from the 
first is higher than the rating from the latter. 
All regressions of the Diff_DWit
MF target variable show that an inflation increase lead to 
a smaller rating difference when the rating from Moody’s is lower than the rating from 
                                                 
27 This subset was already described on section 4.2.2.2. 
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Fitch. The regressions which used the specification with the structural balance variable 
also showed a positive and significant correlation between external debt and the rating 
difference. Thus, when external debt increases, the rating divergence between Moody’s 
and Fitch will grow. 
When running our simple probit regressions for the observations with a rating difference 
between S&P and Moody’s (when the first rating is higher than the latter), we find that 
government net debt contributes negatively to the rating difference, so when its value 
grows, our target variable Diff_UPit
SM will become smaller. 
Table XIII Summary of the simple probit regressions of the speculative-grade dataset. 
 Significant variables Marginal Effect 
Rating difference = 1 
Diff_UPitSF (-) Budget balance (3/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(-) Default last 2Y (1/4) 





Diff_DWitSF (+) Net debt (4/4) 
(-) GDP growth (15/16) 
(-) Default last Y (2/4) 
(-) Default last 2Y (2/4) 






Diff_UPitMF (-) Default last Y (1/4) 
(-) Default last 5Y (1/4) 
-19.5% 
-32.8% 
Diff_DWitMF (-) Inflation (16/16) 
(+) External debt (4/16) 
-0.6%--0.7% 
0.3%-0.4% 
Diff_UPitSM (-) Net debt (4/4) -0.7% 
Diff_DWitSM (+) Gross debt (4/4) 
(-) GDP per capita (12/16) 
0.4%-0.5% 
-0.5%--0.7% 
Note: Coefficient signs and number of significant regressions (besides the total number of run regressions) 
in parenthesis. 
 
Lastly, we analyse the result of our simple probit regressions with the speculative-grade 
dataset, using the Diff_DWit
SM variable as the target variable. These regressions show that 
both GDP per capita and government gross debt variables have statistically significant 
coefficients. In the first case, the negative coefficients of GDP per capita indicate that 
when its value increases, the rating difference shrinks, whereas in the latter case, the 
positive coefficients of the government gross debt variable show that when gross debt 
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gets bigger, the rating difference, when the rating from S&P is lower than the rating from 
Moody’s, also increases. 
A summary of the obtained results when running our simple probit regressions with the 
speculative-grade dataset can be seen in Table XIII (whereas the full results can be 
consulted in Appendix 7). 
5 Conclusion 
By regressing the rating differences of the three main rating agencies with both an ordered 
and a simple probit random-effects model, we find some significant results, indicating the 
influence of some of our explanatory variables on those rating differences. 
We used an ordered probit model, due to both the existence of rating differences above 
2-notches and Al-Sakka and ap Gwilym (2010) approach to the split ratings topic. 
Nonetheless, and as a result of a lower percentage of rating differences higher than 1-
notch, a simple probit model was also used to find if it improved on the results previously 
obtained. 
For the rating differences between S&P and Fitch, when the assigned rating from the first 
was higher than the latter, we found that, independently of the dataset (full, investment- 
or speculative-grade), an increase in the budget balance would decrease the rating 
difference whereas an increase in net debt would increase that same difference. For the 
speculative-grade ratings, we also found that the existence of a default in the last two our 
five years would decrease the rating difference between S&P and Fitch. 
When the rating from S&P is lower than the one from Fitch, we find different behaviours 
when comparing the results from the investment- and speculative-grade datasets: in the 
first case, GDP per capita contributes for a smaller rating gap, whereas a default in the 
last year and inflation contribute for a bigger rating difference. In the latter case, only net 
debt has an increasing effect on the rating difference; external debt, GDP growth and the 
existence of a default in the last year, two or ten years reduce the rating difference. 
The results of our regressions when Moody’s assigns a higher sovereign rating than Fitch 
are less precise. Whereas GDP per capita and inflation respectively influence an 
investment-grade rating difference in a positive and negative way, external debt and a 
default in the last year or five years respectively increase and decrease the analogous 
speculative rating difference. When considering only the investment-grade regressions, 
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our simple probit results also find the budget and structural balances and a default in the 
last five years as negatively correlated with the rating difference. On the other hand, in 
regard to the speculative-grade results about Moody’s and Fitch positive rating difference, 
the simple probit approach does not find external debt as significant, when compared with 
the ordered probit approach for the same dataset. It’s also worth noting the fact that GDP 
growth only appears as significant for the ordered probit regressions with the full dataset. 
With regard to a rating difference when Moody’s assigns a lower rating than Fitch, a 
higher level of government gross debt leads to a smaller rating difference for both 
investment- and speculative-grade datasets, with the exception of the simple probit 
regressions for speculative rating differences, which did not find gross debt significant. 
Our simple probit regressions with the investment-grade dataset also find net debt to 
positively affect the rating difference. Inflation is found to negatively influence a rating 
difference between Moody’s and Fitch when the ratings are in the speculative category 
(irrespective of the chosen probit approach), and a default on the last ten years affect in 
the same negative way only the rating differences within the ordered probit results. 
Looking at the results obtained for the positive rating difference between S&P and 
Moody’s for the investment-grade dataset, we find that an increase in the level of external 
debt leads to a smaller rating gap between those two rating agencies. For the same dataset, 
we find that the simple probit approach also identifies GDP per capita as negatively 
correlated with the rating difference. For the speculative-grade dataset, both probit 
methods show net debt as negatively related with the rating difference. It’s important to 
note that for this specific dependent variable, and contrary to what was seen on the 
regressions of the investment- and speculative- data subsets, only the regressions with the 
full dataset showed all four default dummy variables as significant and affecting 
positively the rating gap. 
The last dependent variable represents the negative rating difference between S&P and 
Moody’s (that is, a lower rating from S&P than from Moody’s). Both of our probit 
regressions with the investment-grade dataset show a positive relation between budget 
balance, gross debt and GDP growth and the rating difference and a negative relation 
between a default in the last year or two and the same rating difference. The simple probit 
results also point to the structural balance and a default in the last five years as 
contributing negatively to the rating difference. When considering the speculative-grade 
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dataset, our results both show that an increase in GDP per capita leads to a smaller rating 
difference. Both budget balance and gross debt affect the rating difference positively, the 
former only for the ordered probit regressions and the latter only for the simple probit 
regressions. External debt also affects negatively the rating difference in our ordered 
probit regressions. 
Table XIV summarises the results from the different regressions run for all specifications 
of explanatory variables and datasets28. 
There are a few improvements and further questions that may be addressed in the future, 
in the scope of this work. Our results showed a low pseudo (McFadden’s) R2 value, 
suggesting that improvements can be made to our model. 
One could also find a way of specifying which agency is responsible for the rating 
difference, or as an alternative, discover which factors, in a split rating situation, are 
correlated with a specific agency upgrade or downgrade. 
Another question that can be further assessed is considering different periods in time (like 
a period before the 1997 Asian crisis, a period between that crisis and the 2007 global 
financial crisis and a last period after the last crisis), where one would possibly find 
different factors affecting the rating differences, reflecting how the rating agencies 
methodologies were applied in those specific periods. 
  
                                                 
28 The data and the Stata procedures used to obtain our results can also be found on 
https://github.com/lejboua/SovereignRatingDifferences 




Table XIV Comparison of the results obtained with the random-effects ordered and simple probit estimations for the full, investment-grade and 
speculative-grade datasets. 
 Full dataset Investment-grade dataset Speculative-grade dataset 
Significant 
variables 
Ordered probit results Simple probit results Ordered probit results Simple probit results Ordered probit results Simple probit results 
Diff_UPitSF (-) Budget balance (4/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(-) Budget balance (4/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(-) Budget balance (1/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) (-) Budget balance (4/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(-) Default last 5Y (1/4) 
(-) Budget balance (3/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(-) Default last 2Y (1/4) 
(-) Default last 5Y (1/4) 
Diff_DWitSF (-) GDP per capita (16/16) 
(-) External debt (16/16) 
(+) Default last 1Y (1/4) 
(+) Default last 2Y (1/4) 
(+) Default last 5Y (4/4) 
(-) GDP per capita (16/16) 
(+) Default last Y (1/4) 
(+) Default last 2Y (1/4) 
(+) Default last 5Y (4/4) 
(-) GDP per capita (15/16) 
(+) Default last 1Y (1/4) 
(-) GDP per capita (12/16) 
(+) Inflation (13/16) 
(+) Default last Y (1/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(-) External debt (15/16) 
(-) GDP growth (15/16) 
(-) Default last 10Y (3/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(-) GDP growth (15/16) 
(-) Default last Y (2/4) 
(-) Default last 2Y (2/4) 
(-) Default last 10Y (4/4) 
Diff_UPitMF (-) GDP growth (9/16) 
(+) External debt (16/16) 
(-) Structural balance (3/4) 
(+) External debt (16/16) 
(+) GDP per capita (12/16) 
(-) Inflation (16/16) 
(+) GDP per capita (2/16) 
(-) Inflation (13/16) 
(-) Budget balance (1/4) 
(-) Structural balance (4/4) 
(-) Default last 5Y (4/4) 
(+) External debt (2/16) 
(-) Default last Y (1/4) 
(-) Default last 5Y (1/4) 
(-) Default last Y (1/4) 
(-) Default last 5Y (1/4) 
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 Full dataset Investment-grade dataset Speculative-grade dataset 
Significant 
variables 
Ordered probit results Simple probit results Ordered probit results Simple probit results Ordered probit results Simple probit results 
Diff_DWitMF (-) Gross debt (2/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(+) Default last 2Y (3/4) 
(+) Default last 5Y (4/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(+) Default last 2Y (3/4) 
(+) Default last 5Y (4/4) 
(-) Gross debt (1/4) (-) Gross debt (1/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(-) Gross debt (4/4) 
(-) Inflation (4/4) 
(-) Default last 10Y (1/4) 
(+) External debt (4/16) 
(-) Inflation (16/16) 
Diff_UPitSM (+) Default last Y (1/4) 
(+) Default last 2Y (4/4) 
(+) Default last 5Y (1/4) 
(+) Default last 10Y (1/4) 
(-) External debt (4/16) 
(+) Default last 5Y (1/4) 
(+) Default last 10Y (1/4) 
(-) External debt (16/16) (-) External debt (16/16) 
(-) GDP per capita (8/16) 
(-) Net debt (4/4) (-) Net debt (4/4) 
Diff_DWitSM (+) Budget balance 
(+) Gross debt 
(+) GDP growth 
(-) GDP per capita 
(+) Budget balance (4/4) 
(+) Gross debt (4/4) 
(+) GDP growth (4/16) 
(-) GDP per capita (12/16) 
(+) Budget balance (4/4) 
(+) Gross debt (4/4) 
(+) GDP growth (8/16) 
(-) Default last 1Y (4/4) 
(-) Default last 2Y (4/4) 
(+) Budget balance (4/4) 
(-) Structural balance (2/4) 
(+) Gross debt (4/4) 
(+) GDP growth (13/16) 
(-) Default last Y (4/4) 
(-) Default last 2Y (4/4) 
(-) Default last 5Y (4/4) 
(-) External debt (4/16) 
(+) Budget balance (3/4) 
(-) GDP per capita (12/16) 
(+) Gross debt (4/4) 
(-) GDP per capita (12/16) 
Note: Coefficient signs and number of significant regressions (besides the total number of run regressions) in parenthesis. 
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Appendix 1. Explanatory variables 
Table A1-1 Summary of the explanatory variables used in this work. 
Predicting 
variables 
Name Variable original 






(percentage of GDP) 
GGX_NGDP: General 
government total 
expenditure (percentage of 
GDP) 
Source: IMF (WEO) 
Difference between government revenues and 





(percentage of potential 
GDP) 
Source: IMF (WEO) 
 
GGXWDG_NGDP Gross debt General government gross 
debt (percentage of GDP) 
Source: IMF (WEO) 
 
GGXWDN_NGDP Net debt General government net 
debt (percentage of GDP) 




Gross domestic product, 
constant prices 
Source: IMF (WEO) 
Annual percentages of constant price GDP, 
year-on-year changes. 
NGDPDPC GDP per 
capita 
Gross domestic product per 
capita, current prices, 
expressed in current U.S. 
dollars per person. 
Source: IMF (WEO) 
 
PCPIPCH Inflation Inflation, average consumer 
prices 
Source: IMF (WEO) 
Annual percentages of average consumer 
prices, year-on-year changes. 
ExtDebtPercGNI External 
debt 
GNI_USD: Gross National 
Income (current US$) 
Source: WB (WDI) 
 
ExtDebtStocksTotalUSD: 
External debt stocks, total 
(DOD, current US$) 
Source: WB (WDI) 
 
The WDI dataset had GNI values for the great 
majority of countries, so the GNI values came 
from the WDI dataset. 
The External Debt values existed on the WDI 
dataset, but there were no values for OECD 
countries and the QEDS dataset will replace 
the WDI dataset as the canonical source for 
external debt. 
However, the QEDS dataset only have values 
from 2003 onwards, so we first used the 





Debt Position and External 
debt stocks, total (DOD, 
current US$) 
Source: JE (QEDS) 
external debt values from the WDI dataset 
(ExtDebtStocksTotalUSD), and then we 
merged the values from the QEDS dataset 
when available (GrossExtDebtPosition). 
Since the QEDS dataset is more recent and 
uses an updated methodology, those values 
were used when values from both datasets 
existed. 
The variable ExtDebtPercGNI was calculated 
using the combined external debt values (from 
WDI and QEDS dataset) and the GNI value, 
and its value equals the external debt value in 
percentage of GNI. 
DefaultLastYear Default in 
the last 
year 
CRAG database has the 
values of debt defaulted by 
countries along the years, 
distributed by type of 
creditor (and the definition 
of 'default' used by the 
authors is consistent with 
much of the literature on 
sovereign defaults). 
The debt value defaulted by country and year 
was processed and converted into a boolean 
variable named DefaultThisYear (1 if the 
country, in that year, had debt defaulted; 0 
otherwise). Afterwards, the variables 
DefaultLastYear, DefaultLast2Years, 
DefaultLast5Years and DefaultLast10Years 
were created, assuming the value 1 if the value 
DefaultThisYear had the value 1 in the 
previous year/two years/five years/ten years, 
for the same country, and 0 otherwise. 
DefaultLast2Years Default in 
the last two 
years 
DefaultLast5Years Default in 
the last five 
years 
DefaultLast10Years Default in 
the last ten 
years 
Note: The sources of information used in this work were the World Economic Outlook dataset (WEO) from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Development Indicators (WDI) from the World Bank 
(WB) and the Quarterly External Debt Statistics dataset (QEDS) from the Joint Effort of the WB and the 
IMF. 
The variables BudgetBal_NGDP, GGSB_NPGDP, GGXWDG_NGDP, GGXWDN_NGDP, NGDPDPC 





Appendix 2. Ordered probit full dataset regressions results 
Table A2-1 Results of our ordered probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Fitch ratings (when the first is higher than the latter), with the full dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level.  




variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_UP_SF budgetbal LastYear -0.0000559** -0.00216 -0.00758 -0.000427 -0.000846 0.0474 1149 0.00710
(-2.01) (-0.21) (-1.48) (-1.09) (-0.31) (0.21)
Last2Years -0.0000557** -0.00238 -0.00750 -0.000430 -0.000818 0.0814 1149 0.00724
(-2.00) (-0.23) (-1.48) (-1.10) (-0.30) (0.38)
Last5Years -0.0000552* -0.00226 -0.00757 -0.000429 -0.000833 0.0510 1149 0.00713
(-1.89) (-0.22) (-1.49) (-1.09) (-0.30) (0.24)
Last10Years -0.0000558** -0.00254 -0.00758 -0.000445 -0.000791 0.150 1149 0.00769
(-2.01) (-0.24) (-1.48) (-1.13) (-0.29) (0.63)
gross_debt LastYear 0.00160 0.00187 -0.00710 -0.000434 -0.000701 0.0651 1149 0.00542
(0.76) (0.12) (-1.39) (-1.10) (-0.25) (0.29)
Last2Years 0.00162 0.00180 -0.00705 -0.000434 -0.000690 0.0786 1149 0.00549
(0.77) (0.12) (-1.39) (-1.10) (-0.25) (0.36)
Last5Years 0.00162 0.00182 -0.00709 -0.000435 -0.000689 0.0644 1149 0.00544
(0.77) (0.12) (-1.40) (-1.10) (-0.25) (0.31)
Last10Years 0.00165 0.00165 -0.00711 -0.000451 -0.000659 0.156 1149 0.00600
(0.78) (0.11) (-1.39) (-1.14) (-0.24) (0.66)
net_debt LastYear 0.0000200** -0.00278 -0.00735 -0.000435 -0.000760 0.0658 1149 0.00528
(2.17) (-0.27) (-1.42) (-1.11) (-0.27) (0.29)
Last2Years 0.0000201** -0.00287 -0.00730 -0.000435 -0.000752 0.0764 1149 0.00534
(2.15) (-0.28) (-1.42) (-1.11) (-0.27) (0.34)
Last5Years 0.0000200** -0.00285 -0.00735 -0.000435 -0.000752 0.0614 1149 0.00529
(2.13) (-0.27) (-1.44) (-1.11) (-0.27) (0.29)
Last10Years 0.0000195** -0.00305 -0.00738 -0.000451 -0.000721 0.148 1149 0.00579
(2.24) (-0.29) (-1.43) (-1.14) (-0.26) (0.62)
structbal LastYear -0.0112 -0.0255 -0.00902 -0.000543 -0.00482 0.0957 922 0.0117
(-0.30) (-1.11) (-1.47) (-1.23) (-1.20) (0.34)
Last2Years -0.0118 -0.0259 -0.00896 -0.000542 -0.00482 0.101 922 0.0118
(-0.31) (-1.14) (-1.48) (-1.23) (-1.20) (0.39)
Last5Years -0.0114 -0.0253 -0.00905 -0.000537 -0.00487 0.0384 922 0.0115
(-0.30) (-1.10) (-1.50) (-1.22) (-1.21) (0.17)
Last10Years -0.0127 -0.0271 -0.00894 -0.000569 -0.00478 0.187 922 0.0126
(-0.34) (-1.20) (-1.46) (-1.25) (-1.19) (0.74)
Default in the last
General government




Table A2-2 Results of our ordered probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Fitch ratings (when the first is lower than the latter), with the full dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 




variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_DW_SF budgetbal LastYear -0.00000571 -0.0249 -0.0124** -0.000115 -0.00408** 0.321 1194 0.0203
(-0.48) (-1.16) (-2.56) (-0.26) (-1.97) (1.54)
Last2Years -0.00000943 -0.0250 -0.0124** -0.0000959 -0.00403* 0.278 1194 0.0195
(-0.80) (-1.16) (-2.56) (-0.22) (-1.95) (1.45)
Last5Years -0.00000950 -0.0277 -0.0125** -0.0000833 -0.00405* 0.429*** 1194 0.0229
(-0.81) (-1.27) (-2.54) (-0.19) (-1.91) (2.67)
Last10Years -0.00000870 -0.0234 -0.0129*** -0.0000744 -0.00439** 0.177 1194 0.0174
(-0.73) (-1.07) (-2.64) (-0.17) (-2.11) (0.97)
gross_debt LastYear 0.00201 -0.0224 -0.0113** -0.000110 -0.00404** 0.326 1194 0.0208
(0.49) (-1.01) (-2.22) (-0.25) (-1.97) (1.57)
Last2Years 0.00205 -0.0224 -0.0114** -0.0000914 -0.00400* 0.281 1194 0.0198
(0.50) (-1.01) (-2.23) (-0.21) (-1.94) (1.46)
Last5Years 0.00218 -0.0250 -0.0113** -0.0000783 -0.00401* 0.433*** 1194 0.0233
(0.54) (-1.11) (-2.21) (-0.18) (-1.90) (2.67)
Last10Years 0.00201 -0.0210 -0.0119** -0.0000695 -0.00435** 0.183 1194 0.0178
(0.50) (-0.93) (-2.32) (-0.16) (-2.10) (1.00)
net_debt LastYear -0.00000526 -0.0250 -0.0125*** -0.000116 -0.00407** 0.324 1194 0.0203
(-0.61) (-1.16) (-2.59) (-0.27) (-1.97) (1.56)
Last2Years -0.00000536 -0.0252 -0.0126*** -0.0000977 -0.00403* 0.278 1194 0.0194
(-0.62) (-1.17) (-2.60) (-0.22) (-1.95) (1.45)
Last5Years -0.00000456 -0.0279 -0.0126*** -0.0000850 -0.00404* 0.428*** 1194 0.0227
(-0.55) (-1.27) (-2.58) (-0.19) (-1.90) (2.66)
Last10Years -0.00000509 -0.0236 -0.0130*** -0.0000760 -0.00438** 0.177 1194 0.0173
(-0.59) (-1.08) (-2.68) (-0.17) (-2.11) (0.97)
structbal LastYear -0.0198 -0.0241 -0.0142** -0.0000627 -0.00609* 0.532** 960 0.0302
(-0.74) (-0.99) (-2.38) (-0.14) (-1.71) (2.19)
Last2Years -0.0213 -0.0264 -0.0141** -0.0000380 -0.00591* 0.508** 960 0.0297
(-0.79) (-1.09) (-2.36) (-0.09) (-1.66) (2.42)
Last5Years -0.0189 -0.0287 -0.0146** -0.0000226 -0.00653* 0.478*** 960 0.0276
(-0.72) (-1.17) (-2.42) (-0.05) (-1.72) (3.05)
Last10Years -0.0148 -0.0245 -0.0147** -0.0000268 -0.00660* 0.151 960 0.0210
(-0.57) (-1.01) (-2.50) (-0.06) (-1.85) (0.88)
Default in the last
General government




Table A2-3 Results of our ordered probit regressions for the difference between Moody’s and Fitch ratings (when the first is higher than the latter), with the full dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 




variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_UP_MF budgetbal LastYear -0.0000154 -0.0396* 0.0109 -0.000621 0.00646* -0.0157 903 0.00933
(-0.37) (-1.90) (1.38) (-0.30) (1.90) (-0.08)
Last2Years -0.0000145 -0.0400* 0.0110 -0.000633 0.00649* 0.0232 903 0.00934
(-0.34) (-1.92) (1.39) (-0.29) (1.90) (0.12)
Last5Years -0.0000160 -0.0391* 0.0108 -0.000615 0.00641* -0.0507 903 0.00941
(-0.37) (-1.89) (1.40) (-0.30) (1.91) (-0.19)
Last10Years -0.0000148 -0.0404** 0.0110 -0.000663 0.00646* 0.0652 903 0.00944
(-0.34) (-1.96) (1.40) (-0.29) (1.89) (0.22)
gross_debt LastYear 0.00509 -0.0303 0.0126 -0.000537 0.00648* -0.0164 903 0.0111
(1.37) (-1.41) (1.50) (-0.35) (1.95) (-0.08)
Last2Years 0.00509 -0.0307 0.0126 -0.000549 0.00651* 0.0270 903 0.0112
(1.38) (-1.43) (1.51) (-0.35) (1.96) (0.14)
Last5Years 0.00507 -0.0299 0.0125 -0.000533 0.00644** -0.0459 903 0.0112
(1.38) (-1.38) (1.53) (-0.35) (1.97) (-0.17)
Last10Years 0.00507 -0.0311 0.0126 -0.000572 0.00648* 0.0624 903 0.0112
(1.37) (-1.45) (1.51) (-0.35) (1.94) (0.21)
net_debt LastYear 0.000403 -0.0395* 0.0112 -0.000627 0.00644* -0.0152 903 0.0111
(0.64) (-1.87) (1.42) (-0.29) (1.89) (-0.07)
Last2Years 0.000399 -0.0399* 0.0113 -0.000639 0.00647* 0.0233 903 0.0111
(0.63) (-1.88) (1.43) (-0.29) (1.90) (0.12)
Last5Years 0.000401 -0.0390* 0.0111 -0.000622 0.00640* -0.0491 903 0.0112
(0.63) (-1.85) (1.44) (-0.29) (1.91) (-0.18)
Last10Years 0.000400 -0.0402* 0.0113 -0.000669 0.00645* 0.0633 903 0.0112
(0.63) (-1.92) (1.44) (-0.28) (1.89) (0.21)
structbal LastYear -0.0256 -0.0337 0.00763 -0.000393 0.00590* -0.241 805 0.0113
(-0.86) (-1.53) (1.00) (-0.31) (1.76) (-0.94)
Last2Years -0.0252 -0.0338 0.00761 -0.000418 0.00586* -0.175 805 0.0109
(-0.85) (-1.53) (1.00) (-0.32) (1.75) (-0.76)
Last5Years -0.0240 -0.0340 0.00760 -0.000425 0.00591* -0.124 805 0.0106
(-0.81) (-1.54) (1.01) (-0.33) (1.79) (-0.39)
Last10Years -0.0254 -0.0362* 0.00783 -0.000488 0.00596* 0.124 805 0.0106
(-0.86) (-1.65) (1.02) (-0.33) (1.79) (0.42)
Default in the last
General government




Table A2-4 Results of our ordered probit regressions for the difference between Moody’s and Fitch ratings (when the first is lower than the latter), with the full dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 




variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_DW_MF budgetbal LastYear 0.00000521 -0.00379 -0.00134 -0.00273 -0.00377 0.287 851 0.00619
(1.05) (-0.16) (-0.26) (-0.44) (-1.24) (1.31)
Last2Years 0.00000138 -0.00911 -0.000588 -0.00254 -0.00366 0.481** 851 0.0120
(0.28) (-0.37) (-0.11) (-0.40) (-1.19) (2.22)
Last5Years 0.00000362 -0.0111 -0.00159 -0.00226 -0.00442 0.522** 851 0.0115
(0.87) (-0.44) (-0.29) (-0.37) (-1.42) (2.42)
Last10Years 0.00000331 -0.00464 -0.00208 -0.00202 -0.00441 0.293 851 0.00512
(0.71) (-0.19) (-0.38) (-0.33) (-1.49) (1.06)
gross_debt LastYear -0.0105* -0.0203 -0.00447 -0.00349 -0.00437 0.264 851 0.0105
(-1.77) (-0.81) (-0.77) (-0.61) (-1.35) (1.20)
Last2Years -0.00983 -0.0244 -0.00358 -0.00325 -0.00424 0.458** 851 0.0158
(-1.64) (-0.98) (-0.60) (-0.56) (-1.29) (2.06)
Last5Years -0.00946 -0.0254 -0.00442 -0.00293 -0.00499 0.488** 851 0.0151
(-1.57) (-0.99) (-0.75) (-0.51) (-1.52) (2.20)
Last10Years -0.0101* -0.0199 -0.00506 -0.00287 -0.00492 0.237 851 0.00912
(-1.74) (-0.77) (-0.85) (-0.50) (-1.55) (0.83)
net_debt LastYear 0.0000138* -0.00365 -0.000953 -0.00272 -0.00380 0.279 851 0.00716
(1.84) (-0.15) (-0.18) (-0.44) (-1.25) (1.28)
Last2Years 0.0000131* -0.00914 -0.000245 -0.00254 -0.00368 0.478** 851 0.0130
(1.73) (-0.37) (-0.05) (-0.40) (-1.20) (2.21)
Last5Years 0.0000147** -0.0111 -0.00120 -0.00226 -0.00444 0.520** 851 0.0126
(2.05) (-0.44) (-0.22) (-0.37) (-1.43) (2.42)
Last10Years 0.0000139* -0.00452 -0.00170 -0.00204 -0.00442 0.284 851 0.00613
(1.93) (-0.18) (-0.31) (-0.33) (-1.49) (1.03)
structbal LastYear 0.0134 -0.00702 -0.000815 -0.00325 -0.00306 0.119 776 0.00324
(0.53) (-0.28) (-0.14) (-0.54) (-0.90) (0.51)
Last2Years 0.00936 -0.0108 -0.0000778 -0.00305 -0.00272 0.328 776 0.00668
(0.37) (-0.43) (-0.01) (-0.49) (-0.81) (1.47)
Last5Years 0.0108 -0.0146 -0.000632 -0.00287 -0.00338 0.425* 776 0.00799
(0.43) (-0.57) (-0.11) (-0.47) (-0.96) (1.81)
Last10Years 0.0140 -0.00882 -0.00115 -0.00289 -0.00349 0.177 776 0.00343
(0.56) (-0.35) (-0.20) (-0.47) (-1.03) (0.58)
Default in the last
General government




Table A2-5 Results of our ordered probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Moody’s ratings (when the first is higher than the latter), with the full dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 




variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_UP_SM budgetbal LastYear 0.00000485 -0.00542 -0.00195 -0.00757 -0.00274 0.247* 1103 0.00447
(0.69) (-0.23) (-0.38) (-1.03) (-0.95) (1.66)
Last2Years 0.00000187 -0.00767 -0.00167 -0.00791 -0.00249 0.336** 1103 0.00619
(0.26) (-0.33) (-0.32) (-1.04) (-0.87) (1.96)
Last5Years 0.00000334 -0.00988 -0.00197 -0.00841 -0.00289 0.349 1103 0.00587
(0.50) (-0.42) (-0.39) (-1.06) (-1.02) (1.54)
Last10Years 0.00000358 -0.00556 -0.00224 -0.00710 -0.00293 0.175 1103 0.00315
(0.52) (-0.24) (-0.44) (-0.98) (-1.02) (0.54)
gross_debt LastYear -0.00000479 -0.00520 -0.00191 -0.00752 -0.00275 0.243 1103 0.00437
(-0.00) (-0.23) (-0.35) (-1.02) (-0.96) (1.64)
Last2Years 0.000224 -0.00739 -0.00152 -0.00789 -0.00248 0.338** 1103 0.00618
(0.07) (-0.33) (-0.28) (-1.04) (-0.87) (1.98)
Last5Years 0.000337 -0.00944 -0.00175 -0.00837 -0.00288 0.351 1103 0.00584
(0.11) (-0.41) (-0.32) (-1.05) (-1.01) (1.57)
Last10Years -0.0000395 -0.00545 -0.00223 -0.00707 -0.00294 0.175 1103 0.00310
(-0.01) (-0.25) (-0.41) (-0.97) (-1.02) (0.54)
net_debt LastYear 0.0000958 -0.00491 -0.00153 -0.00758 -0.00281 0.240 1103 0.00592
(0.93) (-0.21) (-0.30) (-1.02) (-0.97) (1.61)
Last2Years 0.0000929 -0.00731 -0.00129 -0.00795 -0.00255 0.333* 1103 0.00767
(0.89) (-0.31) (-0.25) (-1.04) (-0.88) (1.93)
Last5Years 0.000104 -0.00958 -0.00153 -0.00847 -0.00295 0.353 1103 0.00751
(1.08) (-0.40) (-0.30) (-1.06) (-1.03) (1.57)
Last10Years 0.0000965 -0.00509 -0.00183 -0.00713 -0.00299 0.171 1103 0.00468
(1.09) (-0.22) (-0.36) (-0.98) (-1.03) (0.53)
structbal LastYear -0.0283 0.00401 -0.00406 -0.00605 -0.00582 0.222 926 0.00781
(-0.76) (0.19) (-0.72) (-0.74) (-1.50) (1.28)
Last2Years -0.0323 -0.00183 -0.00327 -0.00695 -0.00519 0.448** 926 0.0129
(-0.89) (-0.08) (-0.59) (-0.80) (-1.32) (2.20)
Last5Years -0.0322 -0.00639 -0.00363 -0.00755 -0.00594 0.515** 926 0.0143
(-0.88) (-0.29) (-0.66) (-0.83) (-1.57) (2.05)
Last10Years -0.0271 -0.00385 -0.00417 -0.00599 -0.00612 0.509* 926 0.0123
(-0.73) (-0.17) (-0.76) (-0.70) (-1.59) (1.78)
Default in the last
General government




Table A2-6 Results of our ordered probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Moody’s ratings (when the first is lower than the latter), with the full dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 




variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_DW_SM budgetbal LastYear 0.000206*** 0.0146 -0.0105* -0.000310 0.00325 -0.0263 1165 0.0110
(3.52) (0.74) (-1.66) (-0.51) (0.99) (-0.17)
Last2Years 0.000207*** 0.0148 -0.0106* -0.000307 0.00319 -0.0639 1165 0.0111
(3.53) (0.76) (-1.67) (-0.51) (0.98) (-0.43)
Last5Years 0.000206*** 0.0148 -0.0106* -0.000313 0.00322 -0.0434 1165 0.0110
(3.52) (0.75) (-1.66) (-0.51) (0.98) (-0.30)
Last10Years 0.000206*** 0.0146 -0.0105* -0.000312 0.00327 -0.0291 1165 0.0110
(3.51) (0.74) (-1.66) (-0.51) (0.99) (-0.15)
gross_debt LastYear 0.00884*** 0.0290* -0.00604 -0.000232 0.00338 -0.0192 1165 0.0124
(3.57) (1.66) (-0.89) (-0.42) (1.04) (-0.12)
Last2Years 0.00881*** 0.0292* -0.00610 -0.000230 0.00335 -0.0432 1165 0.0124
(3.57) (1.67) (-0.90) (-0.41) (1.03) (-0.29)
Last5Years 0.00882*** 0.0292* -0.00609 -0.000233 0.00336 -0.0344 1165 0.0124
(3.53) (1.66) (-0.89) (-0.42) (1.03) (-0.24)
Last10Years 0.00884*** 0.0290* -0.00602 -0.000233 0.00340 -0.0215 1165 0.0124
(3.56) (1.66) (-0.89) (-0.42) (1.04) (-0.11)
net_debt LastYear 0.0000891 0.0173 -0.00957 -0.000284 0.00312 -0.0401 1165 0.00668
(1.04) (0.89) (-1.52) (-0.48) (0.95) (-0.26)
Last2Years 0.0000905 0.0175 -0.00964 -0.000283 0.00307 -0.0719 1165 0.00680
(1.03) (0.90) (-1.53) (-0.48) (0.94) (-0.49)
Last5Years 0.0000876 0.0175 -0.00962 -0.000289 0.00310 -0.0530 1165 0.00672
(1.00) (0.89) (-1.52) (-0.48) (0.94) (-0.37)
Last10Years 0.0000877 0.0172 -0.00953 -0.000287 0.00315 -0.0373 1165 0.00667
(1.02) (0.88) (-1.51) (-0.49) (0.96) (-0.19)
structbal LastYear -0.0392 0.0173 -0.0117* -0.0000832 -0.000571 -0.0768 976 0.00941
(-1.61) (0.83) (-1.83) (-0.16) (-0.15) (-0.39)
Last2Years -0.0395 0.0169 -0.0116* -0.0000932 -0.000462 0.0162 976 0.00928
(-1.63) (0.81) (-1.81) (-0.18) (-0.12) (0.09)
Last5Years -0.0396 0.0169 -0.0116* -0.0000925 -0.000466 0.0192 976 0.00928
(-1.62) (0.80) (-1.81) (-0.18) (-0.12) (0.11)
Last10Years -0.0393 0.0171 -0.0116* -0.0000898 -0.000480 -0.0208 976 0.00928
(-1.62) (0.82) (-1.82) (-0.17) (-0.13) (-0.10)
Default in the last
General government
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Appendix 3. Ordered probit investment-grade dataset regressions results 
Table A3-1 Results of our ordered probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Fitch ratings (when the first is higher than the latter), with the investment-grade 
dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  







BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_UP_SF Investment gradebu getbal LastYear -0.0000355 -0.0174 -0.00827 -0.0310 -0.00592 0.390 773 0.0143
(-1.52) (-0.75) (-1.17) (-0.89) (-1.11) (0.90)
Last2Years -0.0000387* -0.0203 -0.00780 -0.0334 -0.00644 0.480 773 0.0162
(-1.83) (-0.91) (-1.14) (-0.94) (-1.22) (1.18)
Last5Years -0.0000413 -0.0174 -0.00831 -0.0311 -0.00609 0.120 773 0.0126
(-1.12) (-0.77) (-1.23) (-0.85) (-1.14) (0.36)
Last10Years -0.0000422 -0.0144 -0.00868 -0.0277 -0.00599 -0.0604 773 0.0124
(-1.05) (-0.63) (-1.23) (-0.76) (-1.13) (-0.16)
Diff_UP_SF Investment gradegross_debt LastYear -0.00150 -0.0222 -0.00882 -0.0318 -0.00538 0.424 773 0.0117
(-0.29) (-0.86) (-1.23) (-0.92) (-0.98) (0.96)
Last2Years -0.00121 -0.0240 -0.00847 -0.0335 -0.00573 0.422 773 0.0124
(-0.23) (-0.96) (-1.22) (-0.95) (-1.05) (0.99)
Last5Years -0.00146 -0.0217 -0.00896 -0.0313 -0.00544 0.0977 773 0.00944
(-0.28) (-0.86) (-1.30) (-0.86) (-0.98) (0.29)
Last10Years -0.00170 -0.0196 -0.00933 -0.0283 -0.00538 -0.0647 773 0.00933
(-0.34) (-0.75) (-1.31) (-0.78) (-0.96) (-0.18)
Diff_UP_SF Investment gradenet_debt LastYear 0.0000182*** -0.0190 -0.00814 -0.0321 -0.00548 0.426 773 0.0127
(3.59) (-0.82) (-1.15) (-0.92) (-1.02) (0.97)
Last2Years 0.0000183*** -0.0215 -0.00785 -0.0340 -0.00584 0.426 773 0.0135
(3.59) (-0.96) (-1.14) (-0.95) (-1.09) (1.00)
Last5Years 0.0000182*** -0.0186 -0.00828 -0.0317 -0.00554 0.101 773 0.0105
(3.53) (-0.83) (-1.22) (-0.87) (-1.01) (0.30)
Last10Years 0.0000184*** -0.0158 -0.00861 -0.0285 -0.00546 -0.0672 773 0.0103
(3.27) (-0.69) (-1.22) (-0.78) (-1.00) (-0.18)
Diff_UP_SF Investment gradestructbal LastYear -0.0463 -0.00839 -0.0105 -0.0179 -0.00584 0.489 710 0.0159
(-0.70) (-0.25) (-1.30) (-0.50) (-0.94) (1.12)
Last2Years -0.0500 -0.0108 -0.0102 -0.0201 -0.00632 0.509 710 0.0173
(-0.75) (-0.33) (-1.29) (-0.54) (-1.01) (1.16)
Last5Years -0.0460 -0.00825 -0.0106 -0.0178 -0.00590 0.136 710 0.0131
(-0.70) (-0.25) (-1.37) (-0.46) (-0.93) (0.39)
Last10Years -0.0445 -0.00595 -0.0109 -0.0145 -0.00575 -0.0152 710 0.0127
(-0.68) (-0.18) (-1.36) (-0.38) (-0.91) (-0.04)
Default in the last
General government




Table A3-2 Results of our ordered probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Fitch ratings (when the first is lower than the latter), with the investment-grade dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  







BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_DW_SF Investment gradebu getbal LastYear 0.0000113 0.0189 -0.0186** 0.0477 0.0000416 0.687 759 0.0218
(0.68) (0.46) (-2.19) (1.33) (0.01) (1.51)
Last2Years 0.00000514 0.0195 -0.0186** 0.0508 0.0000370 0.423 759 0.0193
(0.31) (0.48) (-2.19) (1.37) (0.01) (0.96)
Last5Years 0.00000635 0.0180 -0.0189** 0.0528 0.000182 0.320 759 0.0188
(0.38) (0.44) (-2.21) (1.34) (0.05) (0.95)
Last10Years 0.0000107 0.0202 -0.0177** 0.0602 0.000108 -0.474 759 0.0212
(0.64) (0.50) (-2.06) (1.42) (0.03) (-1.36)
Diff_DW_SF Investment gradegross_debt LastYear 0.00648 0.0294 -0.0149* 0.0472 0.0000668 0.687 759 0.0277
(1.53) (0.72) (-1.69) (1.32) (0.02) (1.53)
Last2Years 0.00646 0.0298 -0.0150* 0.0501 0.000100 0.444 759 0.0254
(1.53) (0.73) (-1.70) (1.34) (0.03) (1.02)
Last5Years 0.00648 0.0282 -0.0154* 0.0522 0.000259 0.344 759 0.0248
(1.54) (0.68) (-1.72) (1.31) (0.07) (1.03)
Last10Years 0.00617 0.0302 -0.0143 0.0595 0.000133 -0.447 759 0.0267
(1.43) (0.74) (-1.61) (1.39) (0.04) (-1.30)
Diff_DW_SF Investment gradenet_debt LastYear -0.0000105 0.0192 -0.0187** 0.0484 0.00000876 0.680 759 0.0220
(-1.10) (0.47) (-2.21) (1.36) (0.00) (1.51)
Last2Years -0.0000103 0.0196 -0.0188** 0.0513 0.0000358 0.433 759 0.0197
(-1.09) (0.48) (-2.22) (1.38) (0.01) (0.99)
Last5Years -0.00000961 0.0182 -0.0191** 0.0533 0.000163 0.316 759 0.0191
(-1.06) (0.44) (-2.23) (1.35) (0.04) (0.94)
Last10Years -0.00000920 0.0205 -0.0179** 0.0607 0.0000747 -0.468 759 0.0214
(-0.91) (0.50) (-2.09) (1.43) (0.02) (-1.36)
Diff_DW_SF Investment gradestructbal LastYear -0.00915 0.0166 -0.0194** 0.0501 -0.00122 0.807* 689 0.0236
(-0.20) (0.33) (-2.12) (1.07) (-0.27) (1.81)
Last2Years -0.0114 0.0183 -0.0195** 0.0553 -0.00119 0.509 689 0.0206
(-0.25) (0.36) (-2.13) (1.15) (-0.25) (1.18)
Last5Years -0.0122 0.0158 -0.0201** 0.0587 -0.00110 0.408 689 0.0201
(-0.27) (0.31) (-2.16) (1.15) (-0.22) (1.21)
Last10Years -0.0134 0.0208 -0.0189** 0.0677 -0.00126 -0.234 689 0.0188
(-0.30) (0.42) (-2.08) (1.26) (-0.27) (-0.80)
Default in the last
General government




Table A3-3 Results of our ordered probit regressions for the difference between Moody’s and Fitch ratings (when the first is higher than the latter), with the investment-grade 
dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  







BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_UP_MF Investment gradebu getbal LastYear -0.0000328 -0.0394 0.0173* -0.104*** 0.00743 -0.267 665 0.0292
(-0.88) (-1.26) (1.71) (-2.59) (1.46) (-0.61)
Last2Years -0.0000336 -0.0394 0.0172* -0.103** 0.00739 -0.349 665 0.0298
(-0.82) (-1.26) (1.71) (-2.55) (1.44) (-0.96)
Last5Years -0.0000316 -0.0381 0.0174* -0.103** 0.00738 -0.406 665 0.0306
(-0.75) (-1.21) (1.72) (-2.52) (1.41) (-1.10)
Last10Years -0.0000256 -0.0389 0.0174* -0.104** 0.00751 -0.0967 665 0.0287
(-0.60) (-1.24) (1.71) (-2.56) (1.47) (-0.27)
Diff_UP_MF Investment gradegross_debt LastYear 0.00424 -0.0316 0.0181* -0.105** 0.00739 -0.242 665 0.0298
(0.99) (-1.05) (1.72) (-2.56) (1.49) (-0.50)
Last2Years 0.00423 -0.0316 0.0180* -0.104** 0.00736 -0.327 665 0.0304
(0.99) (-1.05) (1.72) (-2.52) (1.47) (-0.85)
Last5Years 0.00404 -0.0307 0.0182* -0.104** 0.00734 -0.387 665 0.0311
(0.96) (-1.02) (1.72) (-2.49) (1.44) (-1.06)
Last10Years 0.00414 -0.0312 0.0181* -0.105** 0.00744 -0.0921 665 0.0294
(0.97) (-1.03) (1.72) (-2.53) (1.49) (-0.26)
Diff_UP_MF Investment gradenet_debt LastYear 0.000509 -0.0389 0.0178* -0.105*** 0.00745 -0.245 665 0.0319
(0.84) (-1.21) (1.76) (-2.61) (1.46) (-0.50)
Last2Years 0.000506 -0.0389 0.0178* -0.105** 0.00742 -0.329 665 0.0324
(0.83) (-1.21) (1.76) (-2.57) (1.44) (-0.84)
Last5Years 0.000475 -0.0377 0.0180* -0.105** 0.00740 -0.394 665 0.0333
(0.79) (-1.17) (1.77) (-2.54) (1.41) (-1.06)
Last10Years 0.000481 -0.0383 0.0179* -0.105*** 0.00750 -0.1000 665 0.0315
(0.78) (-1.19) (1.76) (-2.58) (1.47) (-0.28)
Diff_UP_MF Investment gradestructbal LastYear -0.0409 -0.0245 0.0133 -0.0836** 0.00604 -0.120 635 0.0205
(-1.16) (-0.73) (1.30) (-2.00) (1.24) (-0.25)
Last2Years -0.0412 -0.0245 0.0133 -0.0823* 0.00603 -0.236 635 0.0209
(-1.16) (-0.73) (1.30) (-1.95) (1.23) (-0.65)
Last5Years -0.0407 -0.0235 0.0135 -0.0819* 0.00599 -0.309 635 0.0216
(-1.15) (-0.70) (1.31) (-1.91) (1.21) (-0.87)
Last10Years -0.0408 -0.0243 0.0133 -0.0846** 0.00600 0.00746 635 0.0204
(-1.15) (-0.73) (1.30) (-1.97) (1.22) (0.02)
Default in the last
General government




Table A3-4 Results of our ordered probit regressions for the difference between Moody’s and Fitch ratings (when the first is lower than the latter), with the investment-grade 
dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  







BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_DW_MF Investment gradebu getbal LastYear 0.0000990 0.00710 -0.00426 0.00640 -0.00740 0.0675 555 0.00611
(0.79) (0.19) (-0.56) (0.13) (-1.12) (0.18)
Last2Years 0.0000990 0.00715 -0.00428 0.00675 -0.00750 0.0217 555 0.00606
(0.79) (0.19) (-0.56) (0.14) (-1.18) (0.05)
Last5Years 0.0000989 0.00838 -0.00437 0.00789 -0.00743 -0.0529 555 0.00611
(0.79) (0.21) (-0.58) (0.17) (-1.16) (-0.15)
Last10Years 0.0000946 0.0136 -0.00440 0.0127 -0.00726 -0.350 555 0.00883
(0.76) (0.34) (-0.60) (0.27) (-1.13) (-0.80)
Diff_DW_MF Investment gradegross_debt LastYear -0.00965 -0.0135 -0.00626 0.00554 -0.00944 0.0356 555 0.00748
(-1.42) (-0.32) (-0.83) (0.12) (-1.28) (0.09)
Last2Years -0.00970 -0.0134 -0.00632 0.00588 -0.00949 -0.00651 555 0.00747
(-1.44) (-0.32) (-0.82) (0.12) (-1.35) (-0.02)
Last5Years -0.00991 -0.0122 -0.00646 0.00754 -0.00940 -0.0961 555 0.00764
(-1.48) (-0.29) (-0.86) (0.16) (-1.32) (-0.27)
Last10Years -0.0107* -0.00937 -0.00667 0.0123 -0.00927 -0.402 555 0.0111
(-1.73) (-0.22) (-0.91) (0.27) (-1.31) (-0.91)
Diff_DW_MF Investment gradenet_debt LastYear 0.0000129 0.0115 -0.00297 0.00468 -0.00840 0.0656 555 0.00608
(1.64) (0.31) (-0.39) (0.10) (-1.20) (0.17)
Last2Years 0.0000129 0.0115 -0.00298 0.00497 -0.00850 0.0261 555 0.00604
(1.64) (0.31) (-0.39) (0.10) (-1.27) (0.06)
Last5Years 0.0000128 0.0126 -0.00307 0.00599 -0.00843 -0.0437 555 0.00607
(1.59) (0.33) (-0.41) (0.12) (-1.24) (-0.12)
Last10Years 0.0000129 0.0182 -0.00308 0.0113 -0.00822 -0.371 555 0.00912
(1.60) (0.47) (-0.43) (0.24) (-1.21) (-0.85)
Diff_DW_MF Investment gradestructbal LastYear 0.00915 0.00946 -0.00481 -0.00714 -0.0101 0.0997 532 0.00565
(0.21) (0.24) (-0.60) (-0.12) (-1.29) (0.28)
Last2Years 0.00877 0.00954 -0.00483 -0.00652 -0.0103 0.0509 532 0.00557
(0.20) (0.24) (-0.60) (-0.11) (-1.36) (0.12)
Last5Years 0.00899 0.0107 -0.00499 -0.00471 -0.0102 -0.0394 532 0.00556
(0.20) (0.26) (-0.63) (-0.08) (-1.33) (-0.11)
Last10Years 0.0107 0.0157 -0.00517 0.00365 -0.00996 -0.374 532 0.00860
(0.24) (0.38) (-0.68) (0.06) (-1.31) (-0.83)
Default in the last
General government




Table A3-5 Results of our ordered probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Moody’s ratings (when the first is higher than the latter), with the investment-grade 
dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  







BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_UP_SM Investment gradebu getbal LastYear 0.0000740 -0.00385 -0.00712 -0.0217 -0.0123* -0.0132 746 0.00934
(1.48) (-0.14) (-1.51) (-0.68) (-1.88) (-0.04)
Last2Years 0.0000711 -0.00707 -0.00662 -0.0251 -0.0125* 0.288 746 0.0103
(1.50) (-0.25) (-1.42) (-0.76) (-1.92) (0.71)
Last5Years 0.0000737 -0.00382 -0.00711 -0.0217 -0.0122* -0.00620 746 0.00933
(1.50) (-0.13) (-1.50) (-0.64) (-1.87) (-0.01)
Last10Years 0.0000744 -0.000426 -0.00730 -0.0199 -0.0123* -0.210 746 0.0101
(1.50) (-0.01) (-1.55) (-0.63) (-1.88) (-0.55)
Diff_UP_SM Investment gradegross_debt LastYear 0.000197 -0.00168 -0.00655 -0.0211 -0.0125* 0.0269 746 0.00795
(0.06) (-0.06) (-1.26) (-0.67) (-1.88) (0.10)
Last2Years 0.000444 -0.00462 -0.00591 -0.0243 -0.0127* 0.300 746 0.00902
(0.12) (-0.17) (-1.16) (-0.74) (-1.93) (0.74)
Last5Years 0.000182 -0.00152 -0.00659 -0.0209 -0.0125* 0.0000775 746 0.00794
(0.05) (-0.06) (-1.27) (-0.62) (-1.88) (0.00)
Last10Years 0.000113 0.00186 -0.00683 -0.0190 -0.0125* -0.206 746 0.00865
(0.03) (0.07) (-1.30) (-0.60) (-1.88) (-0.53)
Diff_UP_SM Investment gradenet_debt LastYear 0.000134 -0.000868 -0.00612 -0.0213 -0.0126* 0.0199 746 0.0105
(0.35) (-0.03) (-1.29) (-0.67) (-1.89) (0.07)
Last2Years 0.000125 -0.00413 -0.00567 -0.0244 -0.0129* 0.293 746 0.0115
(0.43) (-0.14) (-1.20) (-0.74) (-1.93) (0.71)
Last5Years 0.000134 -0.00111 -0.00610 -0.0215 -0.0127* 0.0230 746 0.0105
(0.35) (-0.04) (-1.28) (-0.64) (-1.89) (0.05)
Last10Years 0.000190 0.00312 -0.00634 -0.0192 -0.0127* -0.213 746 0.0112
(0.21) (0.10) (-1.34) (-0.60) (-1.89) (-0.53)
Diff_UP_SM Investment gradestructbal LastYear -0.0684 0.00957 -0.00967 -0.0241 -0.0151* 0.122 672 0.0236
(-1.42) (0.28) (-1.47) (-0.82) (-1.90) (0.39)
Last2Years -0.0710 0.00389 -0.00887 -0.0297 -0.0156** 0.467 672 0.0266
(-1.46) (0.11) (-1.36) (-0.94) (-1.99) (1.04)
Last5Years -0.0698 0.00664 -0.00944 -0.0266 -0.0154** 0.182 672 0.0240
(-1.43) (0.19) (-1.44) (-0.82) (-1.97) (0.34)
Last10Years -0.0682 0.0104 -0.00984 -0.0228 -0.0152* 0.00880 672 0.0235
(-1.41) (0.29) (-1.50) (-0.77) (-1.91) (0.02)
Default in the last
General government




Table A3-6 Results of our ordered probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Moody’s ratings (when the first is lower than the latter), with the investment-grade 
dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level.  







BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_DW_SM Investment gradebu getbal LastYear 0.000178*** 0.0416 -0.00533 -0.0403 0.00902 -0.558** 795 0.0232
(3.10) (1.50) (-0.68) (-1.27) (1.40) (-2.47)
Last2Years 0.000178*** 0.0417 -0.00527 -0.0414 0.00902 -0.411* 795 0.0222
(3.11) (1.51) (-0.67) (-1.29) (1.39) (-1.71)
Last5Years 0.000176*** 0.0425 -0.00505 -0.0426 0.00895 -0.377 795 0.0222
(3.09) (1.55) (-0.64) (-1.30) (1.34) (-1.34)
Last10Years 0.000178*** 0.0408 -0.00450 -0.0414 0.00943 -0.401 795 0.0228
(3.11) (1.51) (-0.57) (-1.27) (1.44) (-1.24)
Diff_DW_SM Investment gradegross_debt LastYear 0.00795*** 0.0565** -0.00122 -0.0347 0.00855 -0.620*** 795 0.0243
(3.44) (2.33) (-0.15) (-1.06) (1.43) (-2.90)
Last2Years 0.00787*** 0.0563** -0.00117 -0.0360 0.00854 -0.462** 795 0.0232
(3.41) (2.34) (-0.14) (-1.09) (1.42) (-2.01)
Last5Years 0.00776*** 0.0569** -0.000997 -0.0374 0.00844 -0.406 795 0.0230
(3.41) (2.38) (-0.12) (-1.11) (1.37) (-1.50)
Last10Years 0.00776*** 0.0553** -0.000393 -0.0361 0.00892 -0.413 795 0.0234
(3.40) (2.35) (-0.05) (-1.08) (1.48) (-1.30)
Diff_DW_SM Investment gradenet_debt LastYear 0.000191 0.0467* -0.00419 -0.0406 0.00861 -0.612*** 795 0.0203
(0.35) (1.73) (-0.54) (-1.26) (1.35) (-2.70)
Last2Years 0.000147 0.0466* -0.00413 -0.0417 0.00859 -0.452* 795 0.0192
(0.46) (1.73) (-0.53) (-1.28) (1.34) (-1.89)
Last5Years 0.000120 0.0471* -0.00394 -0.0429 0.00850 -0.377 795 0.0188
(0.57) (1.76) (-0.51) (-1.29) (1.30) (-1.39)
Last10Years 0.000117 0.0456* -0.00335 -0.0417 0.00898 -0.404 795 0.0194
(0.84) (1.73) (-0.43) (-1.26) (1.39) (-1.24)
Diff_DW_SM Investment gradestructbal LastYear -0.0521 0.0488 -0.00486 -0.0318 0.00675 -0.577** 743 0.0171
(-1.38) (1.61) (-0.60) (-0.91) (1.07) (-2.37)
Last2Years -0.0515 0.0489 -0.00485 -0.0337 0.00671 -0.413* 743 0.0160
(-1.38) (1.61) (-0.60) (-0.94) (1.06) (-1.71)
Last5Years -0.0495 0.0493 -0.00470 -0.0356 0.00659 -0.331 743 0.0156
(-1.32) (1.63) (-0.58) (-0.96) (1.02) (-1.18)
Last10Years -0.0480 0.0473 -0.00423 -0.0347 0.00701 -0.314 743 0.0157
(-1.29) (1.62) (-0.52) (-0.94) (1.09) (-0.92)
Default in the last
General government
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Appendix 4. Ordered probit speculative-grade dataset regressions results 
Table A4-1 Results of our ordered probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Fitch ratings (when the first is higher than the latter), with the speculative-grade 
dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level.  






BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_UP_SF Non-Investment gradebu getbal LastYear -0.0000675** -0.00253 -0.00126 -0.000623 0.00185 -0.290 376 0.00768
(-2.50) (-0.27) (-0.16) (-1.45) (0.46) (-0.91)
Last2Years -0.0000661** -0.00246 -0.00129 -0.000634 0.00147 -0.430 376 0.0105
(-2.40) (-0.27) (-0.16) (-1.48) (0.37) (-1.32)
Last5Years -0.0000872*** -0.00267 -0.000837 -0.000629 0.00122 -0.537 376 0.0130
(-2.61) (-0.29) (-0.11) (-1.47) (0.31) (-1.49)
Last10Years -0.0000750*** -0.00457 0.000444 -0.000617 0.00157 -0.797 376 0.0136
(-2.85) (-0.53) (0.06) (-1.34) (0.39) (-1.48)
Diff_UP_SF Non-Investment gradeoss_debt LastYear 0.000400 -0.00165 -0.000766 -0.000628 0.00172 -0.301 376 0.00607
(0.59) (-0.16) (-0.10) (-1.44) (0.44) (-0.94)
Last2Years 0.000389 -0.00161 -0.000807 -0.000639 0.00135 -0.439 376 0.00896
(0.58) (-0.15) (-0.10) (-1.47) (0.34) (-1.35)
Last5Years 0.000419 -0.00200 -0.000226 -0.000638 0.00114 -0.504 376 0.0103
(0.62) (-0.19) (-0.03) (-1.47) (0.29) (-1.49)
Last10Years 0.000463 -0.00355 0.000992 -0.000624 0.00146 -0.788 376 0.0117
(0.66) (-0.35) (0.14) (-1.33) (0.37) (-1.47)
Diff_UP_SF Non-Investment gradenet_debt LastYear 0.00675* -0.0106 0.00194 -0.000644 0.00161 -0.293 376 0.00896
(1.78) (-1.04) (0.24) (-1.45) (0.39) (-0.92)
Last2Years 0.00649* -0.0102 0.00177 -0.000655 0.00124 -0.427 376 0.0116
(1.76) (-0.99) (0.22) (-1.47) (0.31) (-1.31)
Last5Years 0.00622* -0.0104 0.00222 -0.000653 0.00105 -0.484 376 0.0127
(1.76) (-1.01) (0.28) (-1.47) (0.26) (-1.44)
Last10Years 0.00712* -0.0131 0.00383 -0.000644 0.00131 -0.798 376 0.0149
(1.84) (-1.30) (0.52) (-1.33) (0.32) (-1.49)
Diff_UP_SF Non-Investment gradestructbal LastYear 0.00237 -0.0315 -0.00426 -0.000988 -0.00387 -0.327 212 0.0176
(0.08) (-0.89) (-0.38) (-0.96) (-0.64) (-0.87)
Last2Years 0.00730 -0.0279 -0.00473 -0.00108 -0.00473 -0.509 212 0.0243
(0.23) (-0.80) (-0.43) (-0.77) (-0.83) (-1.42)
Last5Years 0.0173 -0.0205 -0.00538 -0.00115 -0.00420 -0.655* 212 0.0319
(0.53) (-0.57) (-0.50) (-0.65) (-0.72) (-1.87)
Last10Years 0.00109 -0.0322 -0.00310 -0.00107 -0.00417 -0.703 212 0.0260
(0.04) (-0.92) (-0.30) (-0.68) (-0.71) (-1.56)
Default in the last
General government




Table A4-2 Results of our ordered probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Fitch ratings (when the first is lower than the latter), with the speculative-grade 
dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level.  






BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_DW_SF Non-Investment gradebu getbal LastYear -0.0000222 -0.0447** -0.00856 -0.000254 -0.00456** -0.240 435 0.0232
(-0.41) (-2.18) (-1.32) (-0.53) (-2.03) (-1.36)
Last2Years -0.0000176 -0.0437** -0.00847 -0.000278 -0.00467** -0.266 435 0.0237
(-0.32) (-2.12) (-1.31) (-0.57) (-2.10) (-1.43)
Last5Years -0.0000189 -0.0468** -0.00815 -0.000280 -0.00442** -0.0914 435 0.0208
(-0.37) (-2.27) (-1.29) (-0.59) (-2.03) (-0.45)
Last10Years -0.0000205 -0.0434** -0.00790 -0.000366 -0.00421** -0.460* 435 0.0246
(-0.40) (-2.06) (-1.26) (-0.69) (-1.97) (-1.70)
Diff_DW_SF Non-Investment gradeoss_debt LastYear -0.00191 -0.0469** -0.00977 -0.000267 -0.00455** -0.238 435 0.0234
(-0.46) (-2.19) (-1.52) (-0.54) (-1.98) (-1.34)
Last2Years -0.00201 -0.0459** -0.00973 -0.000291 -0.00466** -0.268 435 0.0239
(-0.48) (-2.14) (-1.50) (-0.59) (-2.05) (-1.43)
Last5Years -0.00199 -0.0490** -0.00940 -0.000293 -0.00441** -0.0959 435 0.0210
(-0.47) (-2.30) (-1.48) (-0.60) (-1.99) (-0.47)
Last10Years -0.00231 -0.0459** -0.00934 -0.000386 -0.00419* -0.467* 435 0.0250
(-0.55) (-2.11) (-1.46) (-0.70) (-1.92) (-1.74)
Diff_DW_SF Non-Investment gradenet_debt LastYear 0.00678* -0.0417* -0.00610 -0.000257 -0.00456** -0.209 435 0.0275
(1.93) (-1.92) (-0.94) (-0.53) (-2.03) (-1.15)
Last2Years 0.00659* -0.0409* -0.00609 -0.000277 -0.00465** -0.228 435 0.0277
(1.86) (-1.88) (-0.93) (-0.57) (-2.09) (-1.17)
Last5Years 0.00714* -0.0441** -0.00559 -0.000272 -0.00444** -0.0301 435 0.0254
(1.91) (-2.04) (-0.88) (-0.57) (-2.02) (-0.14)
Last10Years 0.00627* -0.0410* -0.00571 -0.000351 -0.00425** -0.389 435 0.0283
(1.77) (-1.87) (-0.89) (-0.68) (-1.98) (-1.34)
Diff_DW_SF Non-Investment gradestructbal LastYear -0.0126 -0.0381* -0.0118 -0.000253 -0.00734* -0.0651 271 0.0260
(-0.47) (-1.95) (-1.54) (-0.56) (-1.67) (-0.32)
Last2Years -0.0132 -0.0383** -0.0118 -0.000254 -0.00736* -0.0250 271 0.0258
(-0.47) (-1.97) (-1.54) (-0.57) (-1.68) (-0.12)
Last5Years -0.0126 -0.0377* -0.0118 -0.000261 -0.00726* -0.0526 271 0.0259
(-0.44) (-1.92) (-1.54) (-0.59) (-1.67) (-0.29)
Last10Years -0.00748 -0.0313 -0.0113 -0.000363 -0.00626 -0.491* 271 0.0326
(-0.26) (-1.58) (-1.48) (-0.77) (-1.47) (-1.73)
Default in the last
General government




Table A4-3 Results of our ordered probit regressions for the difference between Moody’s and Fitch ratings (when the first is higher than the latter), with the speculative-grade 
dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level.  






BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_UP_MF Non-Investment gradebu getbal LastYear 0.000274 -0.0188 0.00347 -0.000868 0.00479 -0.0786 238 0.00857
(1.33) (-0.55) (0.44) (-0.42) (1.05) (-0.37)
Last2Years 0.000278 -0.0205 0.00376 -0.000873 0.00479 -0.0202 238 0.00835
(1.32) (-0.59) (0.46) (-0.43) (1.04) (-0.08)
Last5Years 0.000265 -0.0125 0.00233 -0.000897 0.00458 -0.341 238 0.0130
(1.30) (-0.36) (0.30) (-0.37) (1.01) (-1.24)
Last10Years 0.000274 -0.0193 0.00376 -0.000880 0.00485 -0.147 238 0.00877
(1.32) (-0.55) (0.50) (-0.40) (1.05) (-0.33)
Diff_UP_MF Non-Investment gradeoss_debt LastYear 0.00366 -0.0122 0.00709 -0.000726 0.00551 -0.0835 238 0.00712
(0.85) (-0.35) (0.77) (-0.57) (1.22) (-0.38)
Last2Years 0.00359 -0.0143 0.00738 -0.000731 0.00552 -0.0106 238 0.00685
(0.83) (-0.40) (0.78) (-0.58) (1.20) (-0.04)
Last5Years 0.00406 -0.00510 0.00621 -0.000731 0.00531 -0.362 238 0.0121
(0.93) (-0.14) (0.70) (-0.53) (1.18) (-1.32)
Last10Years 0.00383 -0.0122 0.00750 -0.000728 0.00561 -0.178 238 0.00748
(0.87) (-0.33) (0.86) (-0.54) (1.21) (-0.39)
Diff_UP_MF Non-Investment gradenet_debt LastYear -0.000289 -0.0174 0.00406 -0.000805 0.00504 -0.0756 238 0.00590
(-0.04) (-0.51) (0.51) (-0.47) (1.09) (-0.36)
Last2Years -0.000321 -0.0194 0.00438 -0.000808 0.00506 -0.00685 238 0.00568
(-0.05) (-0.56) (0.54) (-0.48) (1.08) (-0.03)
Last5Years -0.000138 -0.0108 0.00285 -0.000829 0.00482 -0.349 238 0.0106
(-0.02) (-0.31) (0.36) (-0.42) (1.05) (-1.28)
Last10Years -0.000195 -0.0177 0.00432 -0.000815 0.00511 -0.153 238 0.00615
(-0.03) (-0.50) (0.57) (-0.45) (1.09) (-0.34)
Diff_UP_MF Non-Investment gradestructbal LastYear -0.0173 0.00683 -0.000928 0.00819* -0.494* 170 0.0258
(-0.48) (0.95) (-0.23) (1.69) (-1.92)
Last2Years -0.0194 0.00715 -0.000963 0.00792 -0.404 170 0.0229
(-0.52) (0.98) (-0.23) (1.55) (-1.43)
Last5Years -0.00781 0.00460 -0.00126 0.00816 -0.757*** 170 0.0388
(-0.21) (0.68) (-0.16) (1.62) (-2.91)
Last10Years -0.0262 0.00847 -0.000754 0.00835* -0.201 170 0.0186
(-0.68) (1.25) (-0.36) (1.65) (-0.42)
Default in the last
General government




Table A4-4 Results of our ordered probit regressions for the difference between Moody’s and Fitch ratings (when the first is lower than the latter), with the speculative-grade 
dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level.  






BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_DW_MF Non-Investment gradebu getbal LastYear 8.70e-08 -0.00762 0.0000191 -0.0111 -0.000175 -0.102 296 0.00928
(0.02) (-0.25) (0.00) (-1.43) (-0.04) (-0.39)
Last2Years 0.000000996 -0.0152 0.000877 -0.0107 0.00000747 0.132 296 0.00955
(0.23) (-0.48) (0.09) (-1.35) (0.00) (0.44)
Last5Years 0.00000119 -0.0104 0.000419 -0.0110 -0.0000788 -0.0102 296 0.00870
(0.29) (-0.34) (0.04) (-1.41) (-0.02) (-0.03)
Last10Years 0.000000973 -0.000569 0.00116 -0.0133* 0.000625 -0.617 296 0.0148
(0.22) (-0.02) (0.12) (-1.81) (0.15) (-1.48)
Diff_DW_MF Non-Investment gradeoss_debt LastYear -0.0122* -0.0213 -0.00411 -0.0113 -0.000694 -0.107 296 0.0148
(-1.80) (-0.72) (-0.38) (-1.45) (-0.16) (-0.41)
Last2Years -0.0119* -0.0281 -0.00317 -0.0109 -0.000521 0.114 296 0.0148
(-1.69) (-0.92) (-0.29) (-1.37) (-0.12) (0.38)
Last5Years -0.0123* -0.0231 -0.00369 -0.0113 -0.000525 -0.0560 296 0.0143
(-1.68) (-0.79) (-0.35) (-1.45) (-0.13) (-0.17)
Last10Years -0.0145** -0.0149 -0.00372 -0.0141* 0.000142 -0.700* 296 0.0223
(-2.16) (-0.54) (-0.35) (-1.92) (0.03) (-1.65)
Diff_DW_MF Non-Investment gradenet_debt LastYear -0.00288 -0.00970 -0.00118 -0.0110 -0.000314 -0.104 296 0.0101
(-1.06) (-0.33) (-0.11) (-1.41) (-0.07) (-0.40)
Last2Years -0.00271 -0.0170 -0.000240 -0.0106 -0.000123 0.126 296 0.0103
(-0.98) (-0.55) (-0.02) (-1.33) (-0.03) (0.42)
Last5Years -0.00286 -0.0122 -0.000733 -0.0108 -0.000191 -0.0218 296 0.00949
(-1.02) (-0.40) (-0.07) (-1.40) (-0.05) (-0.07)
Last10Years -0.00382 -0.00277 -0.000389 -0.0133* 0.000493 -0.647 296 0.0162
(-1.32) (-0.10) (-0.04) (-1.83) (0.11) (-1.51)
Diff_DW_MF Non-Investment gradestructbal LastYear 0.0151 -0.00562 0.00250 -0.0125 0.00306 -0.404 244 0.0207
(0.44) (-0.17) (0.21) (-1.58) (0.57) (-1.47)
Last2Years 0.0101 -0.0102 0.00355 -0.0118 0.00345 -0.123 244 0.0127
(0.29) (-0.30) (0.31) (-1.46) (0.66) (-0.41)
Last5Years 0.00882 -0.00896 0.00403 -0.0119 0.00398 -0.173 244 0.0128
(0.24) (-0.27) (0.36) (-1.49) (0.75) (-0.48)
Last10Years 0.00946 -0.00348 0.00505 -0.0138* 0.00490 -0.609 244 0.0186
(0.26) (-0.11) (0.44) (-1.76) (0.93) (-1.49)
Default in the last
General government




Table A4-5 Results of our ordered probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Moody’s ratings (when the first is higher than the latter), with the speculative-grade 
dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  






BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_UP_SM Non-Investment gradebu getbal LastYear 0.00000448 0.00171 0.00151 -0.0111 0.00333 0.133 357 0.00913
(0.63) (0.06) (0.18) (-1.12) (0.93) (0.70)
Last2Years 0.00000285 0.00175 0.00147 -0.0110 0.00350 0.132 357 0.00902
(0.41) (0.06) (0.17) (-1.11) (0.96) (0.68)
Last5Years 0.00000322 0.000531 0.00131 -0.0111 0.00323 0.153 357 0.00890
(0.49) (0.02) (0.15) (-1.11) (0.91) (0.68)
Last10Years 0.00000319 -0.000296 0.00120 -0.0105 0.00321 0.252 357 0.00898
(0.48) (-0.01) (0.14) (-1.05) (0.91) (0.65)
Diff_UP_SM Non-Investment gradeoss_debt LastYear -0.00812 -0.00660 -0.00133 -0.0116 0.00347 0.125 357 0.0106
(-0.74) (-0.23) (-0.14) (-1.14) (0.97) (0.67)
Last2Years -0.00787 -0.00633 -0.00132 -0.0116 0.00362 0.124 357 0.0105
(-0.72) (-0.21) (-0.13) (-1.13) (1.00) (0.63)
Last5Years -0.00768 -0.00672 -0.00141 -0.0116 0.00336 0.128 357 0.0103
(-0.69) (-0.22) (-0.14) (-1.13) (0.95) (0.55)
Last10Years -0.00765 -0.00738 -0.00145 -0.0111 0.00335 0.211 357 0.0103
(-0.69) (-0.25) (-0.15) (-1.08) (0.95) (0.52)
Diff_UP_SM Non-Investment gradenet_debt LastYear -0.00752** -0.00128 -0.00166 -0.0109 0.00330 0.121 357 0.0128
(-2.25) (-0.05) (-0.19) (-1.11) (0.93) (0.64)
Last2Years -0.00743** -0.00116 -0.00170 -0.0108 0.00345 0.118 357 0.0127
(-2.26) (-0.04) (-0.19) (-1.11) (0.96) (0.59)
Last5Years -0.00738** -0.00166 -0.00183 -0.0109 0.00321 0.119 357 0.0125
(-2.23) (-0.06) (-0.21) (-1.11) (0.91) (0.51)
Last10Years -0.00737** -0.00231 -0.00188 -0.0104 0.00319 0.199 357 0.0125
(-2.27) (-0.08) (-0.21) (-1.06) (0.91) (0.49)
Diff_UP_SM Non-Investment gradestructbal LastYear 0.0273 0.00208 0.00537 -0.0102 0.00395 -0.118 254 0.0126
(0.67) (0.07) (0.63) (-0.97) (0.87) (-0.50)
Last2Years 0.0227 -0.00447 0.00609 -0.0102 0.00418 0.0648 254 0.0121
(0.55) (-0.15) (0.71) (-0.97) (0.87) (0.25)
Last5Years 0.0206 -0.00990 0.00632 -0.0103 0.00399 0.199 254 0.0131
(0.51) (-0.33) (0.76) (-0.96) (0.89) (0.70)
Last10Years 0.0236 -0.0103 0.00594 -0.00968 0.00377 0.299 254 0.0132
(0.60) (-0.36) (0.72) (-0.90) (0.85) (0.67)
Default in the last
General government




Table A4-6 Results of our ordered probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Moody’s ratings (when the first is lower than the latter), with the speculative-grade 
dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  






BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_DW_SM Non-Investment gradebu getbal LastYear 0.000253 0.00815 -0.0159** -0.000373 0.0000743 0.0000183 370 0.0133
(1.63) (0.38) (-2.09) (-0.61) (0.02) (0.00)
Last2Years 0.000257* 0.00934 -0.0159** -0.000370 0.0000833 -0.0840 370 0.0136
(1.66) (0.42) (-2.09) (-0.60) (0.03) (-0.53)
Last5Years 0.000255* 0.00677 -0.0159** -0.000365 0.0000102 0.0893 370 0.0136
(1.66) (0.30) (-2.07) (-0.60) (0.00) (0.35)
Last10Years 0.000255* 0.00487 -0.0160** -0.000358 -0.000169 0.270 370 0.0145
(1.65) (0.22) (-2.09) (-0.59) (-0.05) (0.85)
Diff_DW_SM Non-Investment gradeoss_debt LastYear 0.00405 0.0126 -0.0125 -0.000334 0.000287 0.00144 370 0.0107
(0.95) (0.63) (-1.43) (-0.57) (0.09) (0.01)
Last2Years 0.00401 0.0134 -0.0125 -0.000331 0.000289 -0.0668 370 0.0109
(0.96) (0.65) (-1.44) (-0.56) (0.09) (-0.42)
Last5Years 0.00407 0.0114 -0.0125 -0.000328 0.000231 0.0798 370 0.0109
(0.94) (0.54) (-1.41) (-0.56) (0.07) (0.31)
Last10Years 0.00408 0.00941 -0.0125 -0.000321 0.0000477 0.264 370 0.0118
(0.93) (0.47) (-1.43) (-0.55) (0.01) (0.82)
Diff_DW_SM Non-Investment gradenet_debt LastYear 0.00569 0.0124 -0.0145* -0.000356 -0.000178 0.0107 370 0.0109
(1.53) (0.60) (-1.87) (-0.60) (-0.05) (0.07)
Last2Years 0.00552 0.0131 -0.0145* -0.000352 -0.000166 -0.0556 370 0.0110
(1.49) (0.62) (-1.87) (-0.59) (-0.05) (-0.35)
Last5Years 0.00591 0.0112 -0.0144* -0.000348 -0.000246 0.0960 370 0.0112
(1.53) (0.52) (-1.84) (-0.58) (-0.07) (0.37)
Last10Years 0.00631 0.00945 -0.0145* -0.000340 -0.000454 0.296 370 0.0123
(1.52) (0.45) (-1.86) (-0.58) (-0.14) (0.89)
Diff_DW_SM Non-Investment gradestructbal LastYear -0.0129 0.00366 -0.0199** -0.000286 -0.00735** -0.0931 233 0.0196
(-0.41) (0.16) (-2.45) (-0.53) (-2.15) (-0.44)
Last2Years -0.0149 0.00190 -0.0199** -0.000286 -0.00737** 0.0324 233 0.0192
(-0.48) (0.08) (-2.43) (-0.53) (-2.16) (0.16)
Last5Years -0.0167 -0.0000483 -0.0199** -0.000271 -0.00757** 0.129 233 0.0198
(-0.54) (-0.00) (-2.42) (-0.50) (-2.11) (0.43)
Last10Years -0.0148 0.00117 -0.0201** -0.000284 -0.00759** 0.0966 233 0.0194
(-0.49) (0.05) (-2.48) (-0.52) (-2.20) (0.33)
Default in the last
General government
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Appendix 5. Simple probit full dataset regressions results 
Table A5-1 Results of our simple probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Fitch ratings (when the first is higher than the latter), with the full dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 




variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_UP_SF budgetbal LastYear -0.0000806* -0.00687 -0.00495 -0.000518 -0.00161 0.0671 1149 0.00807
(-1.90) (-0.59) (-0.85) (-1.28) (-0.48) (0.26)
Last2Years -0.0000807* -0.00702 -0.00487 -0.000519 -0.00158 0.0900 1149 0.00820
(-1.90) (-0.60) (-0.84) (-1.28) (-0.47) (0.38)
Last5Years -0.0000797* -0.00706 -0.00491 -0.000520 -0.00159 0.0712 1149 0.00812
(-1.83) (-0.60) (-0.85) (-1.28) (-0.47) (0.30)
Last10Years -0.0000807* -0.00756 -0.00493 -0.000546 -0.00150 0.223 1149 0.00949
(-1.90) (-0.63) (-0.85) (-1.34) (-0.46) (0.85)
gross_debt LastYear 0.000373 -0.00671 -0.00478 -0.000527 -0.00143 0.0931 1149 0.00376
(0.21) (-0.48) (-0.81) (-1.29) (-0.42) (0.36)
Last2Years 0.000402 -0.00663 -0.00475 -0.000525 -0.00143 0.0851 1149 0.00373
(0.22) (-0.48) (-0.81) (-1.29) (-0.42) (0.35)
Last5Years 0.000406 -0.00678 -0.00476 -0.000529 -0.00141 0.0858 1149 0.00377
(0.23) (-0.48) (-0.82) (-1.29) (-0.42) (0.38)
Last10Years 0.000483 -0.00703 -0.00477 -0.000554 -0.00135 0.227 1149 0.00511
(0.26) (-0.50) (-0.81) (-1.35) (-0.41) (0.88)
net_debt LastYear 0.0000198*** -0.00782 -0.00467 -0.000529 -0.00147 0.0927 1149 0.00464
(3.26) (-0.66) (-0.79) (-1.29) (-0.44) (0.36)
Last2Years 0.0000199*** -0.00780 -0.00465 -0.000526 -0.00148 0.0840 1149 0.00461
(3.25) (-0.66) (-0.80) (-1.29) (-0.44) (0.34)
Last5Years 0.0000198*** -0.00794 -0.00467 -0.000529 -0.00146 0.0833 1149 0.00463
(3.22) (-0.67) (-0.80) (-1.29) (-0.43) (0.37)
Last10Years 0.0000191*** -0.00831 -0.00471 -0.000554 -0.00139 0.220 1149 0.00588
(3.20) (-0.69) (-0.80) (-1.35) (-0.42) (0.83)
structbal LastYear -0.00549 -0.0290 -0.00809 -0.000700 -0.00622 0.108 922 0.0124
(-0.16) (-1.20) (-1.16) (-1.30) (-1.21) (0.35)
Last2Years -0.00573 -0.0289 -0.00809 -0.000694 -0.00624 0.0777 922 0.0122
(-0.17) (-1.20) (-1.17) (-1.30) (-1.22) (0.27)
Last5Years -0.00545 -0.0284 -0.00816 -0.000690 -0.00629 0.0282 922 0.0121
(-0.16) (-1.15) (-1.19) (-1.30) (-1.23) (0.11)
Last10Years -0.00746 -0.0313 -0.00797 -0.000746 -0.00616 0.237 922 0.0140
(-0.23) (-1.30) (-1.15) (-1.27) (-1.20) (0.85)
Default in the last
General government




Table A5-2 Results of our simple probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Fitch ratings (when the first is lower than the latter), with the full dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  




variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_DW_SF budgetbal LastYear -0.0000114 -0.0182 -0.0122** -0.000105 -0.00312 0.225 1194 0.0166
(-0.85) (-0.78) (-2.24) (-0.24) (-1.36) (1.02)
Last2Years -0.0000140 -0.0180 -0.0123** -0.0000951 -0.00309 0.194 1194 0.0162
(-1.04) (-0.77) (-2.25) (-0.22) (-1.35) (1.00)
Last5Years -0.0000141 -0.0209 -0.0122** -0.0000989 -0.00298 0.374** 1194 0.0200
(-1.06) (-0.88) (-2.22) (-0.23) (-1.28) (2.12)
Last10Years -0.0000135 -0.0169 -0.0126** -0.0000845 -0.00336 0.143 1194 0.0152
(-0.99) (-0.71) (-2.30) (-0.19) (-1.48) (0.71)
gross_debt LastYear 0.00156 -0.0163 -0.0114** -0.000103 -0.00311 0.231 1194 0.0167
(0.45) (-0.69) (-2.04) (-0.24) (-1.37) (1.06)
Last2Years 0.00160 -0.0161 -0.0115** -0.0000928 -0.00308 0.194 1194 0.0161
(0.46) (-0.68) (-2.05) (-0.21) (-1.35) (1.00)
Last5Years 0.00171 -0.0189 -0.0113** -0.0000963 -0.00297 0.375** 1194 0.0200
(0.49) (-0.79) (-2.02) (-0.22) (-1.29) (2.12)
Last10Years 0.00161 -0.0150 -0.0118** -0.0000820 -0.00335 0.146 1194 0.0152
(0.46) (-0.63) (-2.11) (-0.19) (-1.49) (0.72)
net_debt LastYear -0.00000599 -0.0185 -0.0124** -0.000107 -0.00310 0.231 1194 0.0165
(-0.69) (-0.79) (-2.28) (-0.25) (-1.35) (1.06)
Last2Years -0.00000604 -0.0183 -0.0125** -0.0000971 -0.00308 0.193 1194 0.0159
(-0.69) (-0.78) (-2.29) (-0.22) (-1.34) (1.00)
Last5Years -0.00000571 -0.0212 -0.0124** -0.000101 -0.00297 0.372** 1194 0.0197
(-0.68) (-0.89) (-2.26) (-0.23) (-1.27) (2.10)
Last10Years -0.00000602 -0.0172 -0.0128** -0.0000864 -0.00335 0.143 1194 0.0150
(-0.69) (-0.72) (-2.34) (-0.20) (-1.47) (0.71)
structbal LastYear -0.0140 -0.0182 -0.0134** -0.0000799 -0.00407 0.432* 960 0.0241
(-0.51) (-0.66) (-1.99) (-0.18) (-1.15) (1.67)
Last2Years -0.0153 -0.0198 -0.0134** -0.0000648 -0.00388 0.424** 960 0.0241
(-0.55) (-0.72) (-1.97) (-0.15) (-1.10) (2.03)
Last5Years -0.0137 -0.0211 -0.0139** -0.0000622 -0.00440 0.383** 960 0.0221
(-0.50) (-0.76) (-2.01) (-0.14) (-1.18) (2.20)
Last10Years -0.0103 -0.0174 -0.0139** -0.0000569 -0.00460 0.0742 960 0.0171
(-0.38) (-0.64) (-2.06) (-0.13) (-1.31) (0.39)
Default in the last
General government




Table A5-3 Results of our simple probit regressions for the difference between Moody’s and Fitch ratings (when the first is higher than the latter), with the full dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  




variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_UP_MF budgetbal LastYear -0.0000483 -0.0316 0.00755 -0.00286 0.00620* -0.0608 903 0.00964
(-1.10) (-1.50) (1.01) (-0.35) (1.80) (-0.21)
Last2Years -0.0000477 -0.0317 0.00755 -0.00290 0.00621* -0.0470 903 0.00961
(-1.06) (-1.50) (1.01) (-0.35) (1.79) (-0.18)
Last5Years -0.0000516 -0.0288 0.00688 -0.00284 0.00603* -0.253 903 0.0119
(-1.14) (-1.36) (0.93) (-0.36) (1.74) (-0.94)
Last10Years -0.0000473 -0.0314 0.00759 -0.00280 0.00626* -0.0858 903 0.00977
(-1.04) (-1.50) (1.03) (-0.34) (1.81) (-0.33)
gross_debt LastYear 0.00644 -0.0201 0.00948 -0.00242 0.00636* -0.0536 903 0.0120
(1.56) (-0.91) (1.21) (-0.30) (1.86) (-0.18)
Last2Years 0.00642 -0.0203 0.00948 -0.00246 0.00636* -0.0383 903 0.0120
(1.56) (-0.91) (1.21) (-0.30) (1.86) (-0.14)
Last5Years 0.00633 -0.0176 0.00881 -0.00238 0.00618* -0.239 903 0.0140
(1.55) (-0.78) (1.14) (-0.31) (1.81) (-0.90)
Last10Years 0.00644 -0.0198 0.00951 -0.00233 0.00640* -0.0869 903 0.0122
(1.56) (-0.89) (1.22) (-0.30) (1.87) (-0.33)
net_debt LastYear 0.000868 -0.0316 0.00804 -0.00299 0.00628* -0.0550 903 0.0125
(1.00) (-1.50) (1.08) (-0.36) (1.81) (-0.19)
Last2Years 0.000864 -0.0317 0.00804 -0.00303 0.00628* -0.0447 903 0.0125
(0.99) (-1.49) (1.08) (-0.37) (1.81) (-0.17)
Last5Years 0.000857 -0.0289 0.00738 -0.00297 0.00611* -0.247 903 0.0146
(0.99) (-1.36) (1.01) (-0.37) (1.76) (-0.91)
Last10Years 0.000861 -0.0313 0.00807 -0.00292 0.00632* -0.0887 903 0.0127
(0.98) (-1.49) (1.10) (-0.36) (1.83) (-0.34)
structbal LastYear -0.0555* -0.0211 0.00559 -0.00100 0.00597* -0.397 805 0.0199
(-1.70) (-0.97) (0.74) (-0.14) (1.72) (-1.16)
Last2Years -0.0548* -0.0207 0.00540 -0.00115 0.00588* -0.375 805 0.0200
(-1.67) (-0.93) (0.72) (-0.15) (1.68) (-1.30)
Last5Years -0.0513 -0.0190 0.00486 -0.00112 0.00590* -0.427 805 0.0223
(-1.56) (-0.85) (0.66) (-0.15) (1.69) (-1.41)
Last10Years -0.0537* -0.0234 0.00606 -0.000945 0.00619* -0.0972 805 0.0166
(-1.67) (-1.07) (0.82) (-0.16) (1.83) (-0.36)
Default in the last
General government




Table A5-4 Results of our simple probit regressions for the difference between Moody’s and Fitch ratings (when the first is lower than the latter), with the full dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  




variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_DW_MF budgetbal LastYear 0.0000117 0.0132 -0.00317 -0.00208 -0.00316 0.386 851 0.0106
(0.78) (0.59) (-0.49) (-0.38) (-0.94) (1.56)
Last2Years 0.00000685 0.00819 -0.00244 -0.00186 -0.00305 0.552** 851 0.0174
(0.46) (0.36) (-0.37) (-0.35) (-0.89) (2.28)
Last5Years 0.0000110 0.00442 -0.00348 -0.00157 -0.00381 0.676*** 851 0.0209
(0.74) (0.19) (-0.51) (-0.37) (-1.06) (3.19)
Last10Years 0.00000980 0.0113 -0.00424 -0.00130 -0.00405 0.428 851 0.00942
(0.66) (0.49) (-0.62) (-0.57) (-1.22) (1.52)
gross_debt LastYear -0.0111 -0.00454 -0.00621 -0.00277 -0.00385 0.360 851 0.0156
(-1.64) (-0.19) (-0.90) (-0.56) (-1.06) (1.45)
Last2Years -0.0104 -0.00844 -0.00534 -0.00251 -0.00371 0.530** 851 0.0220
(-1.54) (-0.35) (-0.76) (-0.49) (-1.00) (2.13)
Last5Years -0.00976 -0.0107 -0.00619 -0.00210 -0.00448 0.643*** 851 0.0249
(-1.44) (-0.42) (-0.87) (-0.42) (-1.16) (2.96)
Last10Years -0.0103 -0.00442 -0.00705 -0.00183 -0.00463 0.372 851 0.0139
(-1.56) (-0.18) (-0.99) (-0.38) (-1.30) (1.27)
net_debt LastYear 0.0000153* 0.0135 -0.00270 -0.00208 -0.00319 0.374 851 0.0120
(1.92) (0.61) (-0.42) (-0.38) (-0.95) (1.53)
Last2Years 0.0000146* 0.00825 -0.00199 -0.00187 -0.00306 0.549** 851 0.0189
(1.82) (0.36) (-0.30) (-0.35) (-0.90) (2.26)
Last5Years 0.0000158** 0.00467 -0.00300 -0.00157 -0.00382 0.671*** 851 0.0223
(2.07) (0.20) (-0.44) (-0.37) (-1.07) (3.17)
Last10Years 0.0000151** 0.0116 -0.00378 -0.00132 -0.00406 0.416 851 0.0108
(1.98) (0.51) (-0.56) (-0.55) (-1.22) (1.47)
structbal LastYear 0.0237 0.00803 -0.00224 -0.00284 -0.00187 0.178 776 0.00571
(0.84) (0.34) (-0.32) (-0.54) (-0.56) (0.68)
Last2Years 0.0197 0.00467 -0.00155 -0.00262 -0.00154 0.360 776 0.00968
(0.70) (0.19) (-0.22) (-0.49) (-0.46) (1.45)
Last5Years 0.0195 -0.00139 -0.00185 -0.00236 -0.00196 0.580** 776 0.0159
(0.70) (-0.06) (-0.26) (-0.44) (-0.58) (2.52)
Last10Years 0.0242 0.00484 -0.00275 -0.00223 -0.00248 0.303 776 0.00675
(0.86) (0.20) (-0.39) (-0.41) (-0.74) (0.94)
Default in the last
General government




Table A5-5 Results of our simple probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Moody’s ratings (when the first is higher than the latter), with the full dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  




variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_UP_SM budgetbal LastYear 0.0000387 0.00326 -0.00340 -0.00973 -0.00372 0.189 1103 0.00697
(0.80) (0.15) (-0.59) (-1.37) (-1.15) (0.97)
Last2Years 0.0000380 0.00124 -0.00314 -0.0101 -0.00354 0.284 1103 0.00860
(0.76) (0.06) (-0.55) (-1.39) (-1.10) (1.43)
Last5Years 0.0000448 -0.00236 -0.00326 -0.0109 -0.00386 0.361 1103 0.00976
(0.90) (-0.11) (-0.57) (-1.42) (-1.20) (1.54)
Last10Years 0.0000397 -0.000537 -0.00340 -0.00954 -0.00378 0.299 1103 0.00785
(0.80) (-0.02) (-0.60) (-1.34) (-1.17) (1.04)
gross_debt LastYear 0.00114 0.00580 -0.00279 -0.00933 -0.00366 0.182 1103 0.00539
(0.30) (0.28) (-0.45) (-1.30) (-1.13) (0.93)
Last2Years 0.00142 0.00387 -0.00239 -0.00974 -0.00345 0.294 1103 0.00732
(0.37) (0.19) (-0.39) (-1.33) (-1.07) (1.48)
Last5Years 0.00167 0.000900 -0.00241 -0.0104 -0.00376 0.361 1103 0.00823
(0.43) (0.04) (-0.39) (-1.35) (-1.16) (1.54)
Last10Years 0.00129 0.00213 -0.00272 -0.00914 -0.00370 0.300 1103 0.00636
(0.34) (0.10) (-0.45) (-1.27) (-1.14) (1.04)
net_debt LastYear 0.000160 0.00482 -0.00285 -0.00946 -0.00379 0.174 1103 0.00774
(0.32) (0.22) (-0.49) (-1.33) (-1.16) (0.89)
Last2Years 0.000154 0.00258 -0.00260 -0.00988 -0.00360 0.282 1103 0.00952
(0.33) (0.11) (-0.45) (-1.35) (-1.11) (1.40)
Last5Years 0.000154 -0.000801 -0.00267 -0.0106 -0.00391 0.357 1103 0.0106
(0.43) (-0.04) (-0.47) (-1.37) (-1.21) (1.52)
Last10Years 0.000134 0.000958 -0.00284 -0.00931 -0.00383 0.291 1103 0.00868
(0.64) (0.04) (-0.50) (-1.30) (-1.18) (1.01)
structbal LastYear -0.0154 0.00545 -0.00551 -0.00794 -0.00912** 0.112 926 0.00917
(-0.41) (0.23) (-0.84) (-1.07) (-2.05) (0.50)
Last2Years -0.0194 -0.000369 -0.00472 -0.00893 -0.00867** 0.383 926 0.0138
(-0.53) (-0.02) (-0.72) (-1.13) (-1.96) (1.63)
Last5Years -0.0206 -0.00643 -0.00486 -0.00994 -0.00923** 0.526** 926 0.0175
(-0.56) (-0.27) (-0.76) (-1.17) (-2.12) (2.00)
Last10Years -0.0158 -0.00678 -0.00542 -0.00862 -0.00943** 0.620** 926 0.0183
(-0.42) (-0.28) (-0.85) (-1.08) (-2.11) (2.40)
Default in the last
General government




Table A5-6 Results of our simple probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Moody’s ratings (when the first is lower than the latter), with the full dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  




variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_DW_SM budgetbal LastYear 0.000216*** 0.0224 -0.0129** -0.000657 0.00245 -0.135 1165 0.0145
(2.92) (0.99) (-2.16) (-0.60) (0.78) (-0.66)
Last2Years 0.000218*** 0.0227 -0.0130** -0.000668 0.00236 -0.165 1165 0.0149
(2.93) (1.00) (-2.18) (-0.59) (0.76) (-0.84)
Last5Years 0.000215*** 0.0224 -0.0129** -0.000679 0.00248 -0.0824 1165 0.0142
(2.90) (0.97) (-2.15) (-0.59) (0.79) (-0.47)
Last10Years 0.000216*** 0.0217 -0.0128** -0.000676 0.00259 -0.0149 1165 0.0139
(2.90) (0.94) (-2.14) (-0.61) (0.82) (-0.06)
gross_debt LastYear 0.0106*** 0.0399* -0.00832 -0.000512 0.00260 -0.124 1165 0.0168
(3.00) (1.77) (-1.35) (-0.69) (0.83) (-0.60)
Last2Years 0.0105*** 0.0400* -0.00844 -0.000519 0.00253 -0.140 1165 0.0169
(3.01) (1.78) (-1.37) (-0.69) (0.81) (-0.71)
Last5Years 0.0106*** 0.0399* -0.00834 -0.000528 0.00263 -0.0664 1165 0.0164
(2.97) (1.77) (-1.34) (-0.69) (0.83) (-0.37)
Last10Years 0.0107*** 0.0394* -0.00817 -0.000528 0.00272 -0.00368 1165 0.0163
(3.01) (1.74) (-1.32) (-0.70) (0.86) (-0.02)
net_debt LastYear 0.0000979 0.0255 -0.0119** -0.000610 0.00232 -0.153 1165 0.00985
(0.97) (1.14) (-2.00) (-0.63) (0.74) (-0.74)
Last2Years 0.0000995 0.0258 -0.0120** -0.000621 0.00223 -0.177 1165 0.0102
(0.99) (1.15) (-2.02) (-0.62) (0.72) (-0.90)
Last5Years 0.0000923 0.0254 -0.0120** -0.000633 0.00235 -0.0940 1165 0.00941
(0.94) (1.12) (-1.99) (-0.63) (0.75) (-0.54)
Last10Years 0.0000923 0.0247 -0.0118** -0.000630 0.00246 -0.0256 1165 0.00913
(0.97) (1.09) (-1.97) (-0.64) (0.79) (-0.11)
structbal LastYear -0.0371 0.0160 -0.0121* -0.000345 -0.00149 -0.236 976 0.0122
(-1.36) (0.68) (-1.96) (-0.56) (-0.44) (-0.90)
Last2Years -0.0372 0.0156 -0.0120* -0.000359 -0.00137 -0.109 976 0.0110
(-1.37) (0.66) (-1.94) (-0.58) (-0.41) (-0.46)
Last5Years -0.0367 0.0159 -0.0121* -0.000364 -0.00133 -0.121 976 0.0111
(-1.34) (0.67) (-1.94) (-0.59) (-0.40) (-0.60)
Last10Years -0.0372 0.0153 -0.0118* -0.000354 -0.00119 -0.102 976 0.0109
(-1.38) (0.65) (-1.90) (-0.59) (-0.35) (-0.38)
Default in the last
General government
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Appendix 6. Simple probit investment-grade dataset regressions results 
Table A6-1 Results of our simple probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Fitch ratings (when the first is higher than the latter), with the investment-grade dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  






variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_UP_SF Investment gradebu getbal LastYear -0.0000493 -0.0345 -0.00673 -0.0365 -0.00620 0.478 773 0.0219
(-1.09) (-1.30) (-0.79) (-1.02) (-0.97) (0.95)
Last2Years -0.0000529 -0.0366 -0.00629 -0.0382 -0.00663 0.476 773 0.0228
(-1.22) (-1.40) (-0.76) (-1.06) (-1.02) (1.05)
Last5Years -0.0000584 -0.0331 -0.00695 -0.0353 -0.00637 0.0760 773 0.0188
(-0.97) (-1.24) (-0.85) (-0.95) (-0.98) (0.21)
Last10Years -0.0000594 -0.0300 -0.00732 -0.0321 -0.00636 -0.0923 773 0.0189
(-0.97) (-1.10) (-0.86) (-0.86) (-0.99) (-0.23)
Diff_UP_SF Investment gradeoss_debt LastYear -0.00208 -0.0412 -0.00749 -0.0375 -0.00530 0.533 773 0.0170
(-0.35) (-1.48) (-0.86) (-1.06) (-0.80) (1.05)
Last2Years -0.00180 -0.0419 -0.00723 -0.0384 -0.00555 0.403 773 0.0159
(-0.30) (-1.53) (-0.84) (-1.07) (-0.82) (0.83)
Last5Years -0.00209 -0.0392 -0.00785 -0.0357 -0.00530 0.0506 773 0.0129
(-0.35) (-1.40) (-0.93) (-0.97) (-0.77) (0.14)
Last10Years -0.00235 -0.0370 -0.00822 -0.0327 -0.00532 -0.100 773 0.0131
(-0.42) (-1.26) (-0.94) (-0.89) (-0.78) (-0.26)
Diff_UP_SF Investment gradenet_debt LastYear 0.0000181*** -0.0367 -0.00657 -0.0379 -0.00542 0.534 773 0.0183
(4.40) (-1.38) (-0.77) (-1.06) (-0.83) (1.06)
Last2Years 0.0000181*** -0.0381 -0.00636 -0.0388 -0.00569 0.409 773 0.0173
(4.41) (-1.46) (-0.76) (-1.08) (-0.86) (0.85)
Last5Years 0.0000181*** -0.0347 -0.00692 -0.0361 -0.00542 0.0542 773 0.0142
(4.34) (-1.31) (-0.84) (-0.97) (-0.81) (0.15)
Last10Years 0.0000184*** -0.0318 -0.00724 -0.0330 -0.00543 -0.103 773 0.0144
(3.84) (-1.17) (-0.84) (-0.89) (-0.82) (-0.25)
Diff_UP_SF Investment gradestructbal LastYear -0.0264 -0.0314 -0.00868 -0.0259 -0.00588 0.597 710 0.0190
(-0.45) (-0.87) (-0.89) (-0.69) (-0.76) (1.18)
Last2Years -0.0294 -0.0324 -0.00845 -0.0269 -0.00622 0.468 710 0.0179
(-0.51) (-0.92) (-0.88) (-0.71) (-0.78) (0.95)
Last5Years -0.0255 -0.0294 -0.00898 -0.0239 -0.00580 0.0775 710 0.0139
(-0.44) (-0.83) (-0.96) (-0.60) (-0.73) (0.21)
Last10Years -0.0240 -0.0271 -0.00929 -0.0210 -0.00575 -0.0569 710 0.0139
(-0.42) (-0.75) (-0.96) (-0.52) (-0.73) (-0.13)
Default in the last
General government




Table A6-2 Results of our simple probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Fitch ratings (when the first is lower than the latter), with the investment-grade dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  






variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_DW_SF Investment gradebu getbal LastYear 0.00000898 0.0233 -0.0170* 0.0622* 0.000364 0.617 759 0.0235
(0.57) (0.51) (-1.89) (1.85) (0.10) (1.41)
Last2Years 0.00000360 0.0238 -0.0170* 0.0648* 0.000358 0.359 759 0.0212
(0.23) (0.53) (-1.89) (1.86) (0.09) (0.84)
Last5Years 0.00000467 0.0225 -0.0172* 0.0664* 0.000484 0.265 759 0.0208
(0.29) (0.49) (-1.90) (1.80) (0.13) (0.80)
Last10Years 0.00000924 0.0246 -0.0160* 0.0739* 0.000486 -0.541 759 0.0251
(0.57) (0.54) (-1.75) (1.86) (0.13) (-1.53)
Diff_DW_SF Investment gradeoss_debt LastYear 0.00486 0.0314 -0.0143 0.0620* 0.000375 0.614 759 0.0266
(1.38) (0.70) (-1.54) (1.85) (0.10) (1.42)
Last2Years 0.00484 0.0317 -0.0143 0.0644* 0.000398 0.373 759 0.0244
(1.38) (0.71) (-1.54) (1.85) (0.11) (0.89)
Last5Years 0.00487 0.0304 -0.0146 0.0660* 0.000534 0.281 759 0.0240
(1.39) (0.68) (-1.56) (1.79) (0.14) (0.86)
Last10Years 0.00452 0.0321 -0.0135 0.0735* 0.000495 -0.520 759 0.0278
(1.27) (0.72) (-1.44) (1.86) (0.14) (-1.49)
Diff_DW_SF Investment gradenet_debt LastYear -0.0000110 0.0235 -0.0172* 0.0630* 0.000353 0.613 759 0.0240
(-1.15) (0.52) (-1.91) (1.87) (0.09) (1.41)
Last2Years -0.0000108 0.0239 -0.0172* 0.0654* 0.000371 0.368 759 0.0218
(-1.14) (0.53) (-1.91) (1.87) (0.10) (0.87)
Last5Years -0.0000105 0.0226 -0.0174* 0.0670* 0.000483 0.261 759 0.0213
(-1.14) (0.50) (-1.92) (1.82) (0.13) (0.80)
Last10Years -0.00000959 0.0248 -0.0162* 0.0745* 0.000471 -0.535 759 0.0255
(-0.95) (0.55) (-1.77) (1.88) (0.12) (-1.53)
Diff_DW_SF Investment gradestructbal LastYear -0.00774 0.0238 -0.0187* 0.0693 -0.000942 0.715* 689 0.0264
(-0.17) (0.42) (-1.85) (1.57) (-0.20) (1.67)
Last2Years -0.00975 0.0253 -0.0187* 0.0738 -0.000916 0.423 689 0.0236
(-0.21) (0.45) (-1.86) (1.62) (-0.19) (1.01)
Last5Years -0.0104 0.0232 -0.0192* 0.0764 -0.000829 0.332 689 0.0231
(-0.22) (0.41) (-1.88) (1.59) (-0.17) (1.00)
Last10Years -0.0115 0.0282 -0.0181* 0.0858* -0.000897 -0.316 689 0.0231
(-0.25) (0.51) (-1.80) (1.70) (-0.19) (-1.05)
Default in the last
General government




Table A6-3 Results of our simple probit regressions for the difference between Moody’s and Fitch ratings (when the first is higher than the latter), with the investment-grade 
dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  






variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_UP_MF Investment gradebu getbal LastYear -0.0000733* -0.0279 0.0147 -0.101** 0.00657 -0.535 665 0.0347
(-1.66) (-0.98) (1.51) (-2.10) (1.33) (-0.73)
Last2Years -0.0000756 -0.0280 0.0146 -0.0996** 0.00652 -0.741 665 0.0379
(-1.62) (-0.98) (1.50) (-2.07) (1.29) (-1.22)
Last5Years -0.0000730 -0.0249 0.0147 -0.102** 0.00656 -0.898* 665 0.0425
(-1.51) (-0.88) (1.50) (-2.04) (1.24) (-1.89)
Last10Years -0.0000612 -0.0268 0.0149 -0.100** 0.00673 -0.251 665 0.0328
(-1.23) (-0.94) (1.53) (-2.05) (1.37) (-0.64)
Diff_UP_MF Investment gradeoss_debt LastYear 0.00715 -0.0153 0.0161 -0.103** 0.00667 -0.467 665 0.0357
(1.34) (-0.51) (1.60) (-2.10) (1.38) (-0.61)
Last2Years 0.00715 -0.0154 0.0160 -0.102** 0.00664 -0.682 665 0.0387
(1.34) (-0.51) (1.59) (-2.07) (1.34) (-1.06)
Last5Years 0.00665 -0.0134 0.0159 -0.104** 0.00666 -0.848* 665 0.0431
(1.26) (-0.45) (1.57) (-2.03) (1.29) (-1.73)
Last10Years 0.00692 -0.0145 0.0162 -0.103** 0.00678 -0.234 665 0.0343
(1.29) (-0.48) (1.61) (-2.04) (1.41) (-0.60)
Diff_UP_MF Investment gradenet_debt LastYear 0.00122 -0.0270 0.0157* -0.105** 0.00681 -0.487 665 0.0399
(1.36) (-0.94) (1.65) (-2.16) (1.34) (-0.61)
Last2Years 0.00122 -0.0271 0.0156 -0.104** 0.00677 -0.693 665 0.0429
(1.36) (-0.95) (1.63) (-2.13) (1.31) (-1.05)
Last5Years 0.00114 -0.0243 0.0157 -0.105** 0.00680 -0.866* 665 0.0475
(1.30) (-0.85) (1.62) (-2.09) (1.25) (-1.73)
Last10Years 0.00114 -0.0259 0.0159* -0.104** 0.00692 -0.259 665 0.0384
(1.25) (-0.91) (1.66) (-2.10) (1.38) (-0.66)
Diff_UP_MF Investment gradestructbal LastYear -0.0721* -0.00286 0.0111 -0.0828* 0.00551 -0.382 635 0.0291
(-1.74) (-0.10) (1.14) (-1.67) (1.19) (-0.47)
Last2Years -0.0725* -0.00290 0.0110 -0.0807 0.00552 -0.623 635 0.0321
(-1.74) (-0.10) (1.13) (-1.62) (1.16) (-0.94)
Last5Years -0.0720* 0.000102 0.0110 -0.0811 0.00548 -0.813* 635 0.0366
(-1.73) (0.00) (1.12) (-1.59) (1.10) (-1.68)
Last10Years -0.0705* -0.00229 0.0112 -0.0834 0.00550 -0.148 635 0.0280
(-1.70) (-0.08) (1.15) (-1.62) (1.19) (-0.39)
Default in the last
General government




Table A6-4 Results of our simple probit regressions for the difference between Moody’s and Fitch ratings (when the first is lower than the latter), with the investment-grade 
dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  






variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_DW_MF Investment gradebu getbal LastYear 0.0000783 0.0442 -0.00991 0.0212 -0.00601 0.108 555 0.0112
(0.54) (1.26) (-1.06) (0.43) (-0.82) (0.28)
Last2Years 0.0000781 0.0436 -0.00982 0.0210 -0.00620 0.115 555 0.0113
(0.54) (1.24) (-1.04) (0.43) (-0.86) (0.26)
Last5Years 0.0000789 0.0427 -0.00989 0.0202 -0.00622 0.0989 555 0.0113
(0.55) (1.18) (-1.05) (0.40) (-0.85) (0.27)
Last10Years 0.0000756 0.0482 -0.01000 0.0254 -0.00600 -0.193 555 0.0121
(0.52) (1.32) (-1.09) (0.51) (-0.83) (-0.42)
Diff_DW_MF Investment gradeoss_debt LastYear -0.0120 0.0181 -0.0126 0.0208 -0.00816 0.0713 555 0.0155
(-1.49) (0.45) (-1.36) (0.44) (-0.93) (0.18)
Last2Years -0.0120 0.0177 -0.0126 0.0207 -0.00831 0.0795 555 0.0156
(-1.48) (0.44) (-1.34) (0.43) (-0.97) (0.18)
Last5Years -0.0120 0.0174 -0.0126 0.0204 -0.00832 0.0549 555 0.0155
(-1.49) (0.42) (-1.36) (0.41) (-0.97) (0.15)
Last10Years -0.0127* 0.0210 -0.0129 0.0257 -0.00813 -0.245 555 0.0171
(-1.66) (0.50) (-1.41) (0.53) (-0.95) (-0.53)
Diff_DW_MF Investment gradenet_debt LastYear 0.0000147* 0.0476 -0.00858 0.0193 -0.00689 0.103 555 0.0132
(1.72) (1.40) (-0.91) (0.39) (-0.87) (0.27)
Last2Years 0.0000147* 0.0469 -0.00848 0.0191 -0.00709 0.116 555 0.0133
(1.72) (1.38) (-0.89) (0.38) (-0.91) (0.26)
Last5Years 0.0000149* 0.0460 -0.00855 0.0181 -0.00712 0.105 555 0.0133
(1.74) (1.31) (-0.89) (0.35) (-0.91) (0.28)
Last10Years 0.0000149* 0.0520 -0.00864 0.0239 -0.00686 -0.219 555 0.0143
(1.76) (1.47) (-0.93) (0.47) (-0.88) (-0.48)
Diff_DW_MF Investment gradestructbal LastYear 0.0275 0.0371 -0.0106 0.00952 -0.00855 0.140 532 0.0121
(0.56) (0.92) (-1.06) (0.16) (-0.92) (0.37)
Last2Years 0.0269 0.0367 -0.0105 0.00937 -0.00886 0.135 532 0.0122
(0.54) (0.90) (-1.04) (0.15) (-0.98) (0.29)
Last5Years 0.0266 0.0361 -0.0106 0.00840 -0.00889 0.107 532 0.0121
(0.53) (0.88) (-1.06) (0.13) (-0.97) (0.27)
Last10Years 0.0280 0.0414 -0.0108 0.0175 -0.00860 -0.224 532 0.0132
(0.57) (0.99) (-1.12) (0.28) (-0.94) (-0.47)
Default in the last
General government




Table A6-5 Results of our simple probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Moody’s ratings (when the first is higher than the latter), with the investment-grade 
dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  






variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_UP_SM Investment gradebu getbal LastYear 0.000107 0.000831 -0.0106* -0.00728 -0.0146** 0.0727 746 0.0151
(1.41) (0.03) (-1.81) (-0.26) (-2.09) (0.18)
Last2Years 0.000106 -0.00209 -0.0102* -0.0104 -0.0148** 0.326 746 0.0166
(1.42) (-0.07) (-1.75) (-0.35) (-2.08) (0.69)
Last5Years 0.000108 0.000398 -0.0106* -0.00742 -0.0147** 0.0469 746 0.0151
(1.43) (0.01) (-1.81) (-0.25) (-2.06) (0.09)
Last10Years 0.000108 0.00240 -0.0107* -0.00598 -0.0146** -0.0677 746 0.0152
(1.43) (0.08) (-1.82) (-0.21) (-2.08) (-0.19)
Diff_UP_SM Investment gradeoss_debt LastYear 0.00261 0.00868 -0.00883 -0.00656 -0.0147** 0.127 746 0.0130
(0.48) (0.34) (-1.35) (-0.23) (-2.06) (0.33)
Last2Years 0.00298 0.00625 -0.00824 -0.00959 -0.0150** 0.364 746 0.0147
(0.53) (0.24) (-1.28) (-0.33) (-2.06) (0.77)
Last5Years 0.00265 0.00823 -0.00884 -0.00667 -0.0148** 0.0754 746 0.0129
(0.49) (0.31) (-1.35) (-0.22) (-2.04) (0.14)
Last10Years 0.00249 0.0104 -0.00906 -0.00477 -0.0148** -0.0621 746 0.0129
(0.46) (0.39) (-1.36) (-0.17) (-2.06) (-0.18)
Diff_UP_SM Investment gradenet_debt LastYear 0.000347 0.00668 -0.00945 -0.00622 -0.0151** 0.0946 746 0.0172
(0.47) (0.23) (-1.60) (-0.22) (-2.10) (0.24)
Last2Years 0.000324 0.00364 -0.00904 -0.00917 -0.0154** 0.326 746 0.0185
(0.45) (0.12) (-1.54) (-0.31) (-2.09) (0.68)
Last5Years 0.000349 0.00591 -0.00941 -0.00670 -0.0152** 0.0791 746 0.0172
(0.47) (0.20) (-1.59) (-0.22) (-2.07) (0.15)
Last10Years 0.000378 0.00881 -0.00960 -0.00457 -0.0152** -0.0777 746 0.0172
(0.51) (0.29) (-1.61) (-0.16) (-2.09) (-0.22)
Diff_UP_SM Investment gradestructbal LastYear -0.0647 0.0139 -0.0140* -0.0101 -0.0183** 0.207 672 0.0300
(-1.26) (0.38) (-1.85) (-0.34) (-2.31) (0.49)
Last2Years -0.0671 0.00913 -0.0133* -0.0148 -0.0188** 0.495 672 0.0332
(-1.29) (0.25) (-1.78) (-0.48) (-2.32) (0.96)
Last5Years -0.0667 0.0104 -0.0137* -0.0125 -0.0187** 0.237 672 0.0306
(-1.28) (0.28) (-1.82) (-0.40) (-2.32) (0.41)
Last10Years -0.0659 0.0113 -0.0140* -0.00992 -0.0185** 0.192 672 0.0303
(-1.27) (0.30) (-1.85) (-0.33) (-2.29) (0.53)
Default in the last
General government




Table A6-6 Results of our simple probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Moody’s ratings (when the first is lower than the latter), with the investment-grade 
dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
 
  






variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_DW_SM Investment gradebu getbal LastYear 0.000189** 0.0559 -0.0112 -0.0497 0.00514 -0.855* 795 0.0324
(2.34) (1.61) (-1.44) (-1.59) (1.20) (-1.88)
Last2Years 0.000189** 0.0559 -0.0112 -0.0509 0.00509 -0.739* 795 0.0316
(2.35) (1.63) (-1.44) (-1.60) (1.17) (-1.69)
Last5Years 0.000186** 0.0583* -0.0110 -0.0529 0.00489 -0.765*** 795 0.0332
(2.32) (1.71) (-1.41) (-1.61) (1.06) (-2.90)
Last10Years 0.000190** 0.0542 -0.0101 -0.0517 0.00540 -0.509 795 0.0300
(2.37) (1.62) (-1.30) (-1.55) (1.26) (-1.38)
Diff_DW_SM Investment gradeoss_debt LastYear 0.0126*** 0.0797** -0.00629 -0.0453 0.00491 -0.922** 795 0.0377
(2.78) (2.43) (-0.79) (-1.32) (1.22) (-2.18)
Last2Years 0.0125*** 0.0795** -0.00628 -0.0466 0.00485 -0.794* 795 0.0366
(2.78) (2.45) (-0.79) (-1.34) (1.19) (-1.92)
Last5Years 0.0120*** 0.0808** -0.00626 -0.0486 0.00457 -0.779*** 795 0.0375
(2.78) (2.52) (-0.78) (-1.36) (1.06) (-3.13)
Last10Years 0.0119*** 0.0768** -0.00522 -0.0475 0.00509 -0.497 795 0.0339
(2.83) (2.46) (-0.66) (-1.31) (1.27) (-1.37)
Diff_DW_SM Investment gradenet_debt LastYear 0.000282 0.0622* -0.0100 -0.0504 0.00479 -0.925** 795 0.0299
(0.48) (1.87) (-1.29) (-1.60) (1.13) (-2.23)
Last2Years 0.000233 0.0620* -0.00997 -0.0514 0.00472 -0.792* 795 0.0289
(0.38) (1.89) (-1.29) (-1.61) (1.10) (-1.93)
Last5Years 0.000180 0.0636* -0.00984 -0.0532 0.00448 -0.766*** 795 0.0295
(0.29) (1.95) (-1.27) (-1.62) (0.99) (-3.15)
Last10Years 0.000138 0.0598* -0.00880 -0.0519 0.00498 -0.510 795 0.0264
(0.52) (1.86) (-1.15) (-1.55) (1.17) (-1.37)
Diff_DW_SM Investment gradestructbal LastYear -0.0693* 0.0607* -0.00901 -0.0458 0.00329 -0.929* 743 0.0295
(-1.71) (1.66) (-1.10) (-1.28) (0.75) (-1.92)
Last2Years -0.0684* 0.0607* -0.00905 -0.0478 0.00321 -0.784* 743 0.0284
(-1.70) (1.67) (-1.11) (-1.31) (0.73) (-1.72)
Last5Years -0.0643 0.0620* -0.00896 -0.0508 0.00291 -0.747*** 743 0.0290
(-1.59) (1.72) (-1.09) (-1.32) (0.64) (-2.84)
Last10Years -0.0617 0.0575* -0.00816 -0.0506 0.00333 -0.412 743 0.0247
(-1.57) (1.66) (-1.02) (-1.28) (0.76) (-1.04)
Default in the last
General government
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Appendix 7. Simple probit speculative-grade dataset regressions results 
Table A7-1 Results of our simple probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Fitch ratings (when the first is higher than the latter), with the speculative-grade dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  





variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_UP_SF Non-Investment gradebu getbal LastYear -0.000113* -0.00689 0.00256 -0.000703 0.000799 -0.317 376 0.0105
(-1.66) (-0.56) (0.27) (-1.51) (0.18) (-1.01)
Last2Years -0.000112 -0.00697 0.00250 -0.000716 0.000382 -0.435 376 0.0131
(-1.60) (-0.55) (0.27) (-1.54) (0.08) (-1.50)
Last5Years -0.000130* -0.00724 0.00298 -0.000714 0.000273 -0.477 376 0.0139
(-1.79) (-0.57) (0.32) (-1.54) (0.06) (-1.28)
Last10Years -0.000121* -0.00901 0.00348 -0.000706 0.000870 -0.384 376 0.00858
(-1.72) (-0.72) (0.38) (-1.46) (0.19) (-0.69)
Diff_UP_SF Non-Investment gradegross_debt LastYear 0.00124 -0.00418 0.00336 -0.000707 0.000639 -0.331 376 0.00744
(0.64) (-0.29) (0.35) (-1.49) (0.14) (-1.06)
Last2Years 0.00113 -0.00457 0.00326 -0.000722 0.000220 -0.447 376 0.0101
(0.61) (-0.31) (0.34) (-1.52) (0.05) (-1.56)
Last5Years 0.00116 -0.00513 0.00388 -0.000722 0.000162 -0.444 376 0.00949
(0.63) (-0.35) (0.41) (-1.53) (0.04) (-1.28)
Last10Years 0.00118 -0.00676 0.00432 -0.000713 0.000727 -0.372 376 0.00497
(0.62) (-0.46) (0.46) (-1.45) (0.16) (-0.67)
Diff_UP_SF Non-Investment gradenet_debt LastYear 0.00817* -0.0152 0.00623 -0.000732 0.000624 -0.324 376 0.0109
(1.94) (-1.15) (0.64) (-1.47) (0.13) (-1.03)
Last2Years 0.00780* -0.0148 0.00596 -0.000746 0.000216 -0.434 376 0.0133
(1.92) (-1.10) (0.62) (-1.50) (0.05) (-1.49)
Last5Years 0.00757* -0.0153 0.00647 -0.000745 0.000175 -0.422 376 0.0125
(1.95) (-1.13) (0.67) (-1.50) (0.04) (-1.22)
Last10Years 0.00844** -0.0175 0.00726 -0.000738 0.000685 -0.387 376 0.00878
(1.97) (-1.29) (0.77) (-1.42) (0.14) (-0.69)
Diff_UP_SF Non-Investment gradestructbal LastYear 0.00530 -0.0121 -0.00724 -0.00108 -0.00615 -0.418 212 0.0201
(0.16) (-0.31) (-0.58) (-0.93) (-0.83) (-1.12)
Last2Years 0.0102 -0.00839 -0.00785 -0.00116 -0.00738 -0.617* 212 0.0296
(0.31) (-0.22) (-0.63) (-0.76) (-1.04) (-1.83)
Last5Years 0.0204 -0.00219 -0.00794 -0.00120 -0.00652 -0.722** 212 0.0361
(0.59) (-0.05) (-0.66) (-0.74) (-0.91) (-1.99)
Last10Years 0.000685 -0.0188 -0.00574 -0.00108 -0.00618 -0.456 212 0.0168
(0.02) (-0.48) (-0.48) (-0.90) (-0.84) (-0.83)
Default in the last
General government




Table A7-2 Results of our simple probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Fitch ratings (when the first is lower than the latter), with the speculative-grade dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  





variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_DW_SF Non-Investment gradebu getbal LastYear -0.0000560 -0.0484** -0.00594 -0.000452 -0.00313 -0.356* 435 0.0310
(-0.80) (-2.25) (-0.82) (-0.71) (-1.22) (-1.76)
Last2Years -0.0000478 -0.0475** -0.00571 -0.000489 -0.00334 -0.391** 435 0.0321
(-0.69) (-2.16) (-0.79) (-0.74) (-1.31) (-1.98)
Last5Years -0.0000525 -0.0514** -0.00532 -0.000482 -0.00293 -0.215 435 0.0254
(-0.80) (-2.36) (-0.77) (-0.77) (-1.20) (-0.93)
Last10Years -0.0000549 -0.0476** -0.00486 -0.000689 -0.00272 -0.705** 435 0.0349
(-0.84) (-2.10) (-0.70) (-0.59) (-1.12) (-2.27)
Diff_DW_SF Non-Investment gradegross_debt LastYear -0.00138 -0.0503** -0.00699 -0.000470 -0.00307 -0.350* 435 0.0301
(-0.30) (-2.18) (-1.01) (-0.71) (-1.20) (-1.71)
Last2Years -0.00151 -0.0493** -0.00683 -0.000507 -0.00329 -0.392** 435 0.0315
(-0.33) (-2.11) (-0.98) (-0.73) (-1.30) (-1.99)
Last5Years -0.00171 -0.0535** -0.00659 -0.000501 -0.00287 -0.217 435 0.0248
(-0.36) (-2.32) (-0.99) (-0.76) (-1.17) (-0.94)
Last10Years -0.00200 -0.0499** -0.00631 -0.000728 -0.00265 -0.706** 435 0.0344
(-0.43) (-2.09) (-0.93) (-0.55) (-1.09) (-2.28)
Diff_DW_SF Non-Investment gradenet_debt LastYear 0.0105* -0.0457** -0.00222 -0.000463 -0.00318 -0.324 435 0.0405
(1.84) (-1.96) (-0.32) (-0.73) (-1.21) (-1.57)
Last2Years 0.0102* -0.0449* -0.00213 -0.000496 -0.00337 -0.353* 435 0.0413
(1.79) (-1.92) (-0.30) (-0.75) (-1.30) (-1.73)
Last5Years 0.0106* -0.0491** -0.00163 -0.000486 -0.00299 -0.155 435 0.0353
(1.82) (-2.12) (-0.25) (-0.78) (-1.18) (-0.64)
Last10Years 0.00998* -0.0451* -0.00163 -0.000693 -0.00281 -0.647** 435 0.0435
(1.74) (-1.88) (-0.24) (-0.60) (-1.12) (-1.98)
Diff_DW_SF Non-Investment gradestructbal LastYear -0.00304 -0.0435** -0.00717 -0.000426 -0.00408 -0.200 271 0.0261
(-0.12) (-2.08) (-0.82) (-0.78) (-0.84) (-0.78)
Last2Years -0.00324 -0.0433** -0.00716 -0.000434 -0.00419 -0.137 271 0.0247
(-0.12) (-2.08) (-0.82) (-0.81) (-0.86) (-0.59)
Last5Years -0.000441 -0.0407** -0.00696 -0.000466 -0.00366 -0.257 271 0.0265
(-0.02) (-2.08) (-0.81) (-0.82) (-0.77) (-1.18)
Last10Years 0.00192 -0.0334 -0.00630 -0.000654 -0.00260 -0.818** 271 0.0450
(0.07) (-1.63) (-0.74) (-0.72) (-0.58) (-2.34)
Default in the last
General government




Table A7-3 Results of our simple probit regressions for the difference between Moody’s and Fitch ratings (when the first is higher than the latter), with the speculative-grade 
dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  





variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_UP_MF Non-Investment gradebu getbal LastYear 0.000248 -0.0230 -0.000970 -0.00546 0.00522 -0.0350 238 0.0174
(1.31) (-0.72) (-0.10) (-0.64) (0.93) (-0.11)
Last2Years 0.000246 -0.0262 -0.000479 -0.00541 0.00526 0.0774 238 0.0176
(1.21) (-0.77) (-0.05) (-0.63) (0.92) (0.18)
Last5Years 0.000237 -0.0124 -0.00302 -0.00568 0.00499 -0.455 238 0.0268
(1.27) (-0.39) (-0.34) (-0.67) (0.91) (-1.19)
Last10Years 0.000244 -0.0193 -0.00107 -0.00561 0.00545 -0.351 238 0.0202
(1.28) (-0.62) (-0.12) (-0.64) (0.96) (-0.77)
Diff_UP_MF Non-Investment gradegross_debt LastYear 0.00745 -0.0106 0.00420 -0.00435 0.00608 -0.0459 238 0.0193
(1.02) (-0.33) (0.39) (-0.55) (1.09) (-0.13)
Last2Years 0.00744 -0.0144 0.00475 -0.00429 0.00613 0.0965 238 0.0195
(1.00) (-0.42) (0.43) (-0.53) (1.07) (0.22)
Last5Years 0.00773 0.000413 0.00236 -0.00452 0.00581 -0.473 238 0.0293
(1.05) (0.01) (0.24) (-0.58) (1.06) (-1.23)
Last10Years 0.00798 -0.00594 0.00443 -0.00445 0.00636 -0.400 238 0.0229
(1.08) (-0.19) (0.43) (-0.55) (1.11) (-0.85)
Diff_UP_MF Non-Investment gradenet_debt LastYear -0.00180 -0.0233 -0.000632 -0.00519 0.00545 -0.0316 238 0.0145
(-0.24) (-0.75) (-0.07) (-0.60) (0.96) (-0.10)
Last2Years -0.00180 -0.0269 -0.0000993 -0.00512 0.00549 0.101 238 0.0149
(-0.24) (-0.82) (-0.01) (-0.59) (0.95) (0.24)
Last5Years -0.00164 -0.0122 -0.00275 -0.00543 0.00522 -0.461 238 0.0241
(-0.22) (-0.39) (-0.30) (-0.63) (0.93) (-1.20)
Last10Years -0.00146 -0.0192 -0.000716 -0.00536 0.00567 -0.352 238 0.0173
(-0.19) (-0.64) (-0.08) (-0.60) (0.98) (-0.77)
Diff_UP_MF Non-Investment gradestructbal LastYear -0.0726 -0.0272 0.00470 -0.00371 0.00836 -0.601** 170 0.0667
(-1.30) (-0.87) (0.54) (-0.38) (1.51) (-2.01)
Last2Years -0.0719 -0.0295 0.00509 -0.00374 0.00818 -0.476 170 0.0606
(-1.25) (-0.88) (0.60) (-0.38) (1.42) (-1.29)
Last5Years -0.0624 -0.0149 0.00170 -0.00459 0.00875 -0.962*** 170 0.0905
(-1.08) (-0.45) (0.24) (-0.46) (1.51) (-3.05)
Last10Years -0.0762 -0.0346 0.00655 -0.00301 0.00875 -0.398 170 0.0569
(-1.40) (-1.11) (0.86) (-0.30) (1.51) (-0.78)
Default in the last
General government




Table A7-4 Results of our simple probit regressions for the difference between Moody’s and Fitch ratings (when the first is lower than the latter), with the speculative-grade 
dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  





variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_DW_MF Non-Investment gradebu getbal LastYear 0.00000548 -0.00570 0.00558 -0.0150*** 0.00230 -0.0369 296 0.0204
(0.39) (-0.20) (0.64) (-2.99) (0.47) (-0.12)
Last2Years 0.00000550 -0.0117 0.00621 -0.0146*** 0.00243 0.159 296 0.0218
(0.40) (-0.39) (0.71) (-2.84) (0.50) (0.48)
Last5Years 0.00000617 -0.0106 0.00556 -0.0145*** 0.00207 0.166 296 0.0213
(0.45) (-0.36) (0.64) (-2.93) (0.43) (0.51)
Last10Years 0.00000528 0.00217 0.00685 -0.0173*** 0.00322 -0.605 296 0.0269
(0.38) (0.08) (0.75) (-3.91) (0.64) (-1.09)
Diff_DW_MF Non-Investment gradegross_debt LastYear -0.00940 -0.0165 0.00266 -0.0150*** 0.00180 -0.0482 296 0.0243
(-1.15) (-0.61) (0.28) (-2.99) (0.37) (-0.16)
Last2Years -0.00904 -0.0220 0.00339 -0.0146*** 0.00193 0.146 296 0.0254
(-1.09) (-0.78) (0.35) (-2.83) (0.40) (0.44)
Last5Years -0.00892 -0.0204 0.00287 -0.0146*** 0.00164 0.133 296 0.0247
(-1.04) (-0.74) (0.30) (-2.95) (0.35) (0.39)
Last10Years -0.0116 -0.0100 0.00345 -0.0178*** 0.00278 -0.680 296 0.0325
(-1.39) (-0.39) (0.35) (-3.96) (0.56) (-1.18)
Diff_DW_MF Non-Investment gradenet_debt LastYear -0.00290 -0.00816 0.00463 -0.0147*** 0.00218 -0.0433 296 0.0210
(-0.62) (-0.29) (0.48) (-2.91) (0.45) (-0.14)
Last2Years -0.00271 -0.0141 0.00534 -0.0144*** 0.00232 0.156 296 0.0223
(-0.58) (-0.47) (0.57) (-2.77) (0.48) (0.47)
Last5Years -0.00267 -0.0128 0.00474 -0.0144*** 0.00198 0.156 296 0.0217
(-0.56) (-0.43) (0.50) (-2.85) (0.41) (0.47)
Last10Years -0.00404 -0.00100 0.00559 -0.0171*** 0.00310 -0.632 296 0.0281
(-0.85) (-0.04) (0.57) (-3.85) (0.62) (-1.12)
Diff_DW_MF Non-Investment gradestructbal LastYear 0.0234 -0.00548 0.0121 -0.0174*** 0.00933* -0.437 244 0.0488
(0.61) (-0.18) (1.19) (-3.63) (1.85) (-1.33)
Last2Years 0.0195 -0.00845 0.0129 -0.0167*** 0.00953* -0.193 244 0.0392
(0.50) (-0.26) (1.36) (-3.40) (1.93) (-0.57)
Last5Years 0.0138 -0.0125 0.0135 -0.0164*** 0.00993* -0.0257 244 0.0372
(0.34) (-0.37) (1.44) (-3.32) (1.92) (-0.07)
Last10Years 0.0163 -0.00263 0.0157 -0.0192*** 0.0119** -0.717 244 0.0472
(0.40) (-0.09) (1.57) (-4.06) (2.29) (-1.20)
Default in the last
General government





Table A7-5 Results of our simple probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Moody’s ratings (when the first is higher than the latter), with the speculative-grade 
dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  





variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_UP_SM Non-Investment gradebu getbal LastYear 0.0000266 0.0125 0.00570 -0.0168 0.00428 0.0220 357 0.0230
(1.02) (0.38) (0.55) (-1.54) (1.11) (0.09)
Last2Years 0.0000263 0.0121 0.00573 -0.0167 0.00433 0.0366 357 0.0230
(1.00) (0.36) (0.55) (-1.54) (1.11) (0.14)
Last5Years 0.0000274 0.00915 0.00581 -0.0168 0.00421 0.137 357 0.0236
(0.99) (0.27) (0.56) (-1.54) (1.09) (0.50)
Last10Years 0.0000276 0.00130 0.00595 -0.0159 0.00418 0.499 357 0.0268
(1.00) (0.04) (0.58) (-1.44) (1.10) (1.28)
Diff_UP_SM Non-Investment gradegross_debt LastYear -0.00656 0.00626 0.00348 -0.0170 0.00443 0.000209 357 0.0220
(-0.63) (0.19) (0.31) (-1.52) (1.15) (0.00)
Last2Years -0.00648 0.00562 0.00358 -0.0170 0.00447 0.0313 357 0.0221
(-0.63) (0.16) (0.32) (-1.52) (1.16) (0.12)
Last5Years -0.00613 0.00370 0.00378 -0.0170 0.00437 0.108 357 0.0224
(-0.57) (0.11) (0.34) (-1.52) (1.14) (0.37)
Last10Years -0.00542 -0.00330 0.00425 -0.0161 0.00433 0.469 357 0.0253
(-0.52) (-0.09) (0.39) (-1.43) (1.15) (1.16)
Diff_UP_SM Non-Investment gradenet_debt LastYear -0.0190* 0.00156 0.000608 -0.0165 0.00443 -0.00766 357 0.0325
(-1.83) (0.04) (0.06) (-1.55) (1.15) (-0.03)
Last2Years -0.0190* 0.00134 0.000634 -0.0166 0.00443 0.00191 357 0.0325
(-1.84) (0.04) (0.06) (-1.55) (1.15) (0.01)
Last5Years -0.0188* -0.00000380 0.000771 -0.0166 0.00440 0.0559 357 0.0326
(-1.75) (-0.00) (0.07) (-1.55) (1.15) (0.18)
Last10Years -0.0184* -0.00715 0.00122 -0.0158 0.00435 0.405 357 0.0348
(-1.66) (-0.20) (0.11) (-1.45) (1.15) (0.95)
Diff_UP_SM Non-Investment gradestructbal LastYear 0.0418 0.00204 0.0103 -0.0164 0.00246 -0.295 254 0.0351
(1.06) (0.06) (0.91) (-1.42) (0.41) (-0.88)
Last2Years 0.0353 -0.00598 0.0111 -0.0164 0.00237 -0.0469 254 0.0302
(0.88) (-0.17) (0.98) (-1.42) (0.40) (-0.14)
Last5Years 0.0289 -0.0169 0.0119 -0.0165 0.00248 0.246 254 0.0323
(0.75) (-0.48) (1.09) (-1.41) (0.44) (0.74)
Last10Years 0.0318 -0.0280 0.0118 -0.0156 0.00196 0.671 254 0.0390
(0.87) (-0.80) (1.10) (-1.31) (0.36) (1.62)
Default in the last
General government




Table A7-6 Results of our simple probit regressions for the difference between S&P and Moody’s ratings (when the first is lower than the latter), with the speculative-grade 
dataset. 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 values were obtained using the McFadden’s (1974) approach. The coloured cells highlight significant results. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  





variables BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var Year 2 Years 5 Years 10 Years N
Pseudo 
R^2
Diff_DW_SM Non-Investment gradebu getbal LastYear 0.000231 -0.00243 -0.0138* -0.000752 0.00183 -0.111 370 0.0206
(1.48) (-0.12) (-1.90) (-0.60) (0.41) (-0.62)
Last2Years 0.000241 -0.000955 -0.0138* -0.000789 0.00178 -0.206 370 0.0221
(1.54) (-0.04) (-1.92) (-0.55) (0.40) (-1.02)
Last5Years 0.000232 -0.00452 -0.0140* -0.000737 0.00174 0.0526 370 0.0200
(1.47) (-0.22) (-1.92) (-0.63) (0.38) (0.20)
Last10Years 0.000237 -0.0108 -0.0143** -0.000662 0.00139 0.451 370 0.0244
(1.49) (-0.53) (-1.96) (-0.72) (0.31) (1.14)
Diff_DW_SM Non-Investment gradegross_debt LastYear 0.0119* 0.0110 -0.00801 -0.000611 0.00216 -0.0928 370 0.0231
(1.70) (0.45) (-1.05) (-0.70) (0.49) (-0.50)
Last2Years 0.0116* 0.0118 -0.00808 -0.000630 0.00211 -0.170 370 0.0242
(1.70) (0.47) (-1.06) (-0.68) (0.48) (-0.84)
Last5Years 0.0123* 0.00936 -0.00810 -0.000599 0.00204 0.0725 370 0.0229
(1.73) (0.39) (-1.04) (-0.71) (0.46) (0.26)
Last10Years 0.0131* 0.00373 -0.00819 -0.000549 0.00165 0.482 370 0.0278
(1.79) (0.16) (-1.05) (-0.75) (0.37) (1.13)
Diff_DW_SM Non-Investment gradenet_debt LastYear 0.00329 0.000567 -0.0126* -0.000718 0.00170 -0.108 370 0.0164
(0.74) (0.03) (-1.79) (-0.62) (0.38) (-0.60)
Last2Years 0.00296 0.00146 -0.0127* -0.000745 0.00164 -0.185 370 0.0176
(0.66) (0.07) (-1.81) (-0.59) (0.37) (-0.92)
Last5Years 0.00358 -0.00116 -0.0127* -0.000707 0.00161 0.0513 370 0.0159
(0.75) (-0.05) (-1.79) (-0.65) (0.36) (0.19)
Last10Years 0.00448 -0.00673 -0.0128* -0.000638 0.00125 0.461 370 0.0205
(0.87) (-0.32) (-1.80) (-0.73) (0.28) (1.11)
Diff_DW_SM Non-Investment gradestructbal LastYear -0.0220 -0.0147 -0.0179** -0.000474 -0.00844 -0.223 233 0.0318
(-0.63) (-0.65) (-2.25) (-0.72) (-1.51) (-0.90)
Last2Years -0.0247 -0.0172 -0.0181** -0.000471 -0.00855 -0.0350 233 0.0290
(-0.70) (-0.77) (-2.24) (-0.74) (-1.51) (-0.14)
Last5Years -0.0268 -0.0191 -0.0181** -0.000456 -0.00867 0.0602 233 0.0291
(-0.76) (-0.87) (-2.25) (-0.72) (-1.50) (0.20)
Last10Years -0.0272 -0.0221 -0.0187** -0.000446 -0.00920 0.253 233 0.0309
(-0.80) (-1.01) (-2.34) (-0.73) (-1.64) (0.60)
Default in the last
General government





Appendix 8. Significance of the explanatory variables across all regressions 
 
Table A8-1 Number of regressions where our explanatory variables were significant, split by dataset and type of model used. 
 
Count significant vars (total) BudgetBal_NGDP_Var GGSB_NPGDP_Var GGXWDG_NGDP_Var GGXWDN_NGDP_Var NGDP_RPCH NGDPDPC_Var PCPIPCH ExtDebtPercGNI_Var LastYear Last2Years Last5Years Last10Years
ORDERED PROBIT (Full Dataset) 8 0 6 8 13 24 0 32 2 8 9 1
ORDERED PROBIT (Investment Grade Dataset) 5 0 5 4 8 27 16 16 5 4 0 0
ORDERED PROBIT (Speculative Grade Dataset) 7 0 4 12 15 12 4 21 1 0 2 4
SIMPLE PROBIT (Full Dataset) 8 3 4 8 4 28 0 20 1 4 9 1
SIMPLE PROBIT (Investment Grade Datset) 5 6 5 8 13 22 26 16 5 4 8 0
SIMPLE PROBIT (Speculative Grade Dataset) 3 0 4 12 15 12 16 4 3 4 2 4
Number of regressions where the explanatory 
variable was significant 36 9 28 52 68 125 62 109 17 24 30 10
Number of regressions using the explanatory 
variable 144 144 144 144 576 576 576 576 144 144 144 144
25,00% 6,25% 19,44% 36,11% 11,81% 21,70% 10,76% 18,92% 11,81% 16,67% 20,83% 6,94%
